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Experiments

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Introduction

Experiments, broadly defined as any research design in which “the researcher intervenes in the [data generating process] by purposely manipulating elements of the environment” (Morton and Williams 2010, p. 30; cited under Methodology), occupy a small but growing place in international relations (IR) researchers’ methodological toolboxes. This bibliography introduces the reader to the opportunities for experimental research in IR. Many of the authors featured in this bibliography cite Alvin Roth, who writes that experiments may serve three research goals: (i) “searching for facts,” (ii) “speaking to theorists,” and (iii) “whispering in the ears of princes” (Kagel and Roth 1995, p. 22). More specifically, experiments give researchers the opportunity to uncover processes that are difficult to observe because of selection effects or spurious correlation. Experiments also isolate explanatory variables and perform direct tests of formal models and other theories. Furthermore, as some of the scholarship in this review will demonstrate, policy and nonprofit organizations are welcoming collaborations with scholars to use experiments to more systematically assess their programming. While experiments are not appropriate for investigating all research questions, IR scholars should become more familiar with them as they provide specific advantages for making causal inferences and, contrary to many common criticisms of experimental methods, help bridge political science and policy. This bibliography attempts to provide sufficient coverage of technical and applied research on experiments. It begins with a set of general overviews on the field and lists journals that regularly publish experimental IR research. Next, the core concepts of experimental methods are reviewed, followed by specific entries for laboratory, field, and survey experiments. In addition to being characterized by methodological approach, experiments in IR are also separated by ontology, and the next section covers the economic and psychological traditions in the field. The last sections of this bibliography are dedicated to reviewing substantive research that uses experiments in the four major IR research areas: conflict processes, foreign policy analysis, international political economy, and international organization. Throughout these sections, annotations note the experimental methodology used, in addition to their substantive contributions, so that interested readers may also identify projects by their methodological approach.

General Overviews

While the use of experiments in IR and political science more generally has grown tremendously since the mid-1990s, the surge is more of a renaissance than a revolution. As Druckman, et al. 2011 and Green and Gerber 2002 document, the use of experiments in political science research dates to the 1950s. Experimental political science rose in prevalence in the 1970s, when there was even a (now out-of-print) specialized journal, *The Experimental Study of Politics*, that published research using experimental methods. IR, McDermott 2011 adds, enjoys one of the longest traditions of conducting experiments in the field of political science. The three overviews in this section guide the reader through this tradition, navigating the different methodologies and approaches used across political science scholarship. McDermott 2011 is an appropriate segue to other recent overviews by Hudson and Butler 2010 and Hyde 2015, which all direct the reader to innovations in the use of experiments specifically for the field of IR. These three articles also highlight a number of opportunities for new research that makes use of experiments to address unresolved puzzles and answer significant policy questions.

Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. “Experimentation in Political Science.” In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 3–11. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

A brief overview to the highly useful *Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. The authors describe the general history of experimental political science, particularly its tremendous growth after 1990, as well as the multiple purposes, methodologies, and epistemologies of the research approach.

Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science." In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*. Edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 805–832. New York: Norton, 2002.

Though primarily focused on the utility of field experiments, a concise overview of the historical use of experiments in political science and a guide around their common challenges. Examples from American politics field experiments highlight the advantages of experiments for inferring causation, resolving empirical puzzles, and accumulating knowledge.

Hudson, Natalie Florea, and Michael J. Butler. "The State of Experimental Research in IR: An Analytical Survey." *International Studies Review* 12 (2010): 165–192.

Review essay on experiments in IR research, including a discussion of their origins in classroom simulations and examples in new technologies (e.g., neuro-politics, agent-based modeling). Authors devise a unique and useful classification heuristic, emphasizing experimental IR's interdisciplinary and subfield linkages, bridges with other methods, and analysis of new phenomena.

Hyde, Susan D. "Experiments in International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 403–424.

An impressively comprehensive discussion of recent experimental research in IR. With a focus on laboratory, field, and survey examples, the author advises on the use of convenience, elite, and representative subject pools; demonstrates how experiments may be useful in testing midrange theories; and chronicles the accumulative research process through experimentation.

McDermott, Rose. "New Directions for Experimental Work in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 503–520.

Chronicles experimental methods in IR research through conflict processes (negotiation, arms races, crisis and war) and foreign policy decision-making. The author reviews new ways to experimentally test questions traditionally important to IR, including those on identity, personality, and social status, through an interdisciplinary lens.

Journals

IR research that uses experiments is published broadly across the major and specialty journals in the field. The *American Journal of Political Science* and the *American Political Science Review* publish work from a cross-section of the field, while *International Studies Quarterly*, *International Organization*, and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* are among the dominant IR journals that accept experimental work, along with research using other methodologies. More recently, a specialized journal, the *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, embarked with the mission to exclusively feature experimental research from all political science subfields.

***American Journal of Political Science*. 1973–.**

A major discipline journal published for the Midwest Political Science Association, which accepts research using various methodologies, including experimental methods.

***American Political Science Review*. 1906–.**

The flagship journal of the American Political Science Association featuring state-of-the-art research from across the political science discipline.

International Organization. 1947–.

A premier IR journal that specializes in research on international cooperation, institutions, law, and political economy. Published for the International Organization Foundation.

International Studies Quarterly. 1956–.

Published by the International Studies Association, accepts research from a cross-section of IR specializations and frequently features experimental research.

Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1957–.

Connected with the Peace Science Society (International), publishes interdisciplinary (political science, law, economics, sociology, IR, psychology) research on global conflict.

Journal of Experimental Political Science. 2014–.

Sponsored by the Experimental Research section of the American Political Science Association, this new journal (first issue published 2014) specializes in research that uses experimental methods, broadly defined. Accepts research from a cross-section of the political science discipline.

Methodology

Students in introductory research methods classes are often introduced to experiments as the “gold standard” for making causal inferences. This reputation is owed to two general features of experimental research design, control and randomization, which allow the researcher to identify the effects of specific treatment conditions (independent variables). Doubt on experimental methods begins to be cast, though, as the researcher attempts to draw conclusions from “artificial” experimental results to the “real world;” this doubt seems to be the most salient preoccupation in conversations between experimental researchers and scholars using other observational data. McDermott 2011 and Morton and Williams 2010 confront this debate over internal and external validity in the use of experiments. Druckman, et al. 2011; McDermott 2002; and Morton and Williams 2010 further orient the reader to the essential elements of designing experiments in political science; however, Morton and Williams 2010 is the most extensive treatment. As the projects in this section demonstrate, experimental research designs take a wide range of forms. Their most salient differentiating characteristics are where they physically take place relative to their subjects and the artificiality they aim to establish (Morton and Williams). Mintz, et al. 2011 provides the most direct discussion of the trade-offs among laboratory, field, and survey experiments for the IR audience. Separate sections reviewing each of these methodologies follow.

Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. “Experiments: An Introduction to Core Concepts.” In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 15–26. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

A useful primer on experimental political science, guiding the reader through common terminology, applications, and best practices. Concludes with a technical appendix on average treatment effects, stable unit treatment value assumptions, and noncompliance assumptions for statistical evaluation of experimental data.

McDermott, Rose. "Experimental Methodology in Political Science." *Political Analysis* 10 (2002): 325–342.

A highly practical discussion of the central concerns for experiments: impact versus control; mundane versus experimental realism; internal versus external validity; deception; and laboratory versus field experiments. The author explains the roots of political science experiments in psychology and behavioral economics and raises overlapping research questions among the three fields.

McDermott, Rose. "Internal and External Validity." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 27–40. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Noting an almost "monomaniacal" preoccupation with external validity in political science research, McDermott guides the reader through the specific and practical concerns associated with internal and external validity. Two key research approaches address the inherent trade-offs: Designing experiments for optimal experimental realism and replicating tests across contexts, populations, and measurement.

Mintz, Alex, Yi Yang, and Rose McDermott. "Experimental Approaches to International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 493–501.

A comprehensive overview of the types of experimental methods used in IR research. The authors explain the relative benefits and drawbacks of five different experimental methods (traditional laboratory, survey, process tracing, field, and cognitive neuroscience) along with their applications for the purposes of generating data and testing theory.

Morton, Rebecca B., and Kenneth Williams. *Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to Lab*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

The most detailed instructional book on the intention, design, execution, and ethics of experiments for the general political science audience. The authors cover a number of subjects relevant to experimental political science, including formal theory testing, deception, and specifics on randomization, subject recruitment, and causal inference.

Laboratory Experiments

Laboratory experiments are characterized by their setting, which brings subjects to some researcher-designated location to perform the experimental protocol (Morton and Williams 2010, cited under Methodology). In this regard, laboratory experiments allow researchers to exert the greatest control over the research design and the environmental factors that may otherwise cause distractions. Therefore, many of the general guides for conducting experimental research are applicable (and often speak to) to the laboratory setting. Druckman 2005 provides specific guidance, though, for the use, design, and analysis of experiments for conflict analysis. One research design issue that is specific to laboratory experiments is the use of convenience samples. Unlike field experiments or survey experiments, which often strive to descriptively and substantively represent the more general population from which they sample, laboratory experiments draw participants from nearby populations. As a result, much laboratory research is conducted with the use of university students as subjects, whose demographics or cognitive processes may not generalize well. Mintz, et al. 2006 constructs one of the more well-cited research designs that tests this question, comparing results from an experiment that used student subjects in one iteration and military officers in another. Consensus remains, though, that the use of student subjects is unproblematic for addressing many questions relevant to IR and offers a number advantages over elite subject pools. Druckman and Kam 2011 and Kam, et al. 2007 provide highly practical instruction on the recruitment of convenience samples in laboratory experiments.

Druckman, James N. "Part II. Performing Experiments." In *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*. By James N. Druckman, 53–120. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2005.

A technical guide to conflict analysis experiments, targeted to students. Chapter 3 covers conceptual issues, including validity, and explains different experimental designs. Chapter 4 explains analysis of variance methods for analyzing experimental data. General enough to instruct on any experimental approach; specifically written for laboratory experiments and role-playing simulations.

Druckman, James N., and Cindy D. Kam. "Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the 'Narrow Data Base.'" In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 41–57. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Discusses the threats student subject pools pose to internal and external validity. Technical analysis of these threats using Monte Carlo simulation reveals that student subject populations are only of concern when treatment effects differ systematically over populations and the responsible moderating factor has virtually no variance in the relevant populations.

Kam, Cindy D., Jennifer R. Wilking, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. "Beyond the 'Narrow Data Base': Another Convenience Sample for Experimental Research." *Political Behavior* 29 (2007): 415–440.

Constructively responds to the prevalent concern that student subject pools weaken experiment generalizability. The authors outline four circumstances when student subjects pose few risks to external validity before suggesting campus staff as an alternative pool. Comparisons of these convenience samples show few substantive differences between campus staff and local residents.

Mintz, Alex, Steven B. Redd, and Arnold Vedlitz. "Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs and International Relations?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2006): 757–776.

A highly instructive study comparing student samples with foreign policy professionals when testing theories related to elite decision-making. Process tracing analysis of counterterrorism responses reveals that students make significantly different choices, use different information and strategies, and weigh exogenous factors, indicating their unsuitability as subjects for some analyses.

Field Experiments

Gerber 2011, (p. 116) stated, "Field experiments seek to combine the internal validity of randomized experiments with increased external validity, or generalizability, gained through conducting the experiment in real-world settings." Closely related, and included in this section, are natural experiments, which Dunning 2008 reviews. Though not true experiments in which the researcher controls the environment and random assignment of explanatory variables, natural experiments take advantage of observational data that were generated "as if" at random. Both methods stake the middle ground between internal and external validity. Moreover, field experiments, as Gerber 2011 and Green and Gerber 2003 chronicle, have enjoyed the longest tradition in experimental political science and are experiencing a promising resurgence due to growing interest in policy organizations to use field experiments in assessing their programs (see Hyde 2010). Yet many of the authors in this section note that field experiments face a number of unique challenges relative to the experimental approach including explanatory power, research costs, and noncompliance. Gerber 2011 and Green and Gerber 2003 provide concise solutions to these barriers, while Gerber and Green 2012 treats the subject comprehensively. Hyde 2010 gives a unique perspective on working with policy and nongovernmental organizations.

Dunning, Thad. "Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural Experiments." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2008): 282–293.

A pragmatic guide to the design and use of natural experiments in political science with detailed illustrations from the literature. Dunning's central contribution articulates a framework that situates natural experiments along a continuum between purely observational studies and laboratory experiments for causal inference.

Gerber, Alan S. "Field Experiments in Political Science." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 115–138. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

A technical demonstration of the improvements field experiments provide over observational and some laboratory methods and an adjustment for treatment effects, specifically complier average causal effects, to deal with noncompliance and heterogeneous treatment effects. Addresses field experiment drawbacks, including ethical dilemmas, background and spillover effects, and replication incentives.

Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. New York: Norton, 2012.

A comprehensive manual on the logic and execution of field experiments, written for the general political science audience. Ideal for students, the text explains design, implementation, and inferential challenges from field experiments; provides illustrative examples and problem sets; and guides the reader around common field experiment barriers such as funding.

Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. "The Underprovision of Experiments in Political Science." *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 589 (2003): 94–112.

Citing implications from Bayesian analysis in their previous work, this review advances two arguments for randomized field experiments to a political science audience: field experiments overcome bias plaguing observational data and improve generality over laboratory experiments. Cautions on the challenges and potential flaws in field experiments balance the authors' optimism.

Hyde, Susan D. "The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations." *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628 (2010): 72–84.

A short overture for greater use of field experiments in IR accompanied by practical suggestions for experimentation on the roles of information in cooperation and institutions in democratization. For IR experiments to grow, scholars must articulate precise, micro-foundational arguments from grand theory and invest in collaboration with policy actors.

Survey Experiments

Survey experiments may be simply defined as a randomized, individual decision-making experiment, such as might be conducted in a laboratory or field, that is embedded in a survey (Morton and Williams 2010, p. 206; cited under Methodology). The appeals of survey experiments, which in part explain their recent meteoric rise in political science research, are that they allow the researcher to control treatment conditions as in a lab while efficiently and cost-effectively drawing a representative sample of subjects. Sniderman 2011 in the author's autobiography on the use of survey experiments in political science notes that survey experiments make it possible to uncover answers to particularly sensitive questions without contamination from experimenter effects and social desirability. They also facilitate collaboration and the simultaneous execution of multiple simple experiments on a common subject pool. Making its way from describing the first computer-assisted survey experiments conducted at the University of California, Berkeley, to the large National Science Foundation-funded Multi-Investigator Project and Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), Sniderman 2011 also gives practical advice on the purpose and design of survey experiments. As survey experiments, particularly those conducted through TESS, have grown in popularity, some concerns have emerged in the field regarding potential damage to causal inferences from survey experiments. Gaines, et al. 2007 raises a number of issues for researchers to consider. Barabas and Jerit 2010, to a degree, validates some of these concerns in its systematic response to Gaines, et al. 2007. Both articles provide practical guidance for scholars using survey experiments, especially in multiple investigator projects.

Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit. "Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?" *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010): 226–242.

In response to Gaines, et al. 2007, the authors compare the effects of survey experiments against natural media exposure on respondents' beliefs and knowledge. They find probative evidence that treatment effects in survey experiments are larger than those observed from subjects' natural exposure, warranting caution in survey experiment generalizability.

Gaines, Brian J., James H. Kuklinski, and Paul J. Quirk. "The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined." *Political Analysis* 15 (2007): 1–20.

Friendly critique of potentially confounding practices and contaminations in survey experiments. Reexamination of common survey experiment practices that deviate from laboratory settings recommended. Contamination from other embedded experiments and subjects' exposure to the real-world phenomenon studied are indicated as particularly troubling to the method; the authors supply technical solutions.

Sniderman, Paul M. "The Logic and Design of the Survey Experiment: An Autobiography of a Methodological Innovation." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 102–114. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

A nontechnical conversation about the design and purpose of survey experiments in political science. Sniderman covers three approaches—manipulative, permissive, and facilitative—and their applications in the study of racial politics to demonstrate the ability of survey experiments to elicit respondents' predisposed values.

Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences.

A National Science Foundation-funded project that works with social science researchers to implement survey experiments through GfK Knowledge Networks, a nationally representative online subject panel. Proposed instruments undergo external peer-review before they are fielded by TESS.

Other Technologies

While laboratory, field, and survey experiments occupy the three largest categories of experimental methods in IR, there are four additional technologies that merit specific attention: Process Tracing, Simulations, Online Labor Markets, and Neuroscience. Many of these other approaches follow traditional laboratory or survey methods, but they employ specific tools or occur in settings such that they have generated their own literature.

Process Tracing

Process tracing experiments resemble laboratory experiments in many respects. The primary innovation of process tracing experiments over other approaches, though, is that process tracing experiments use computer-assisted technology to monitor and record how participants process information and choices in decision-making settings, rather than simply the types of decisions they make. The approach is most commonly associated with Richard Lau and David Redlawsk in American politics and Alex Mintz in IR. These scholars make their process tracing software, the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment and the Decision Board 4.0, respectively, available online. Lau and Redlawsk 2001 and Mintz, et al. 1997 are both good representations of this approach and concise instructional guides.

Decision Board 4.0.

The Decision Board permits researchers to design and execute decision-making scenarios and record subjects' responses.

Dynamic Process Tracing Environment.

The Dynamic Process Tracing Environment provides a web-accessible platform from which to design and execute process tracing experiments.

Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2001): 951–971.

The authors examine the use of heuristics and explain the use of process tracing methods in an election experiment. Process tracing analysis finds cognitive shortcuts common but not necessarily useful for non-sophisticated voters; voters without prior political knowledge were more likely to vote "incorrectly."

Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven Redd, and Amy Carnes. "The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1997): 533–566.

Leveraging process tracing to gather data on subjects' information acquisition methods and choices in two foreign policy scenarios, the authors examine context complexity on decision-making among Air Force officers. This paper illustrates the novel method, which finds evidence supporting poliheuristic decision theory.

Simulations

Simulations have been responsible for uncovering some core tenets of international conflict and cooperation theories. Initial theory testing on nuclear crisis negotiation, for example, was conducted through role-playing simulations in which human subjects acted out US–Soviet disarmament talks. Later, the computer simulations of the iterated prisoners' dilemma by Axelrod 1984 resulted in a watershed moment for neo-liberalism. Yet, the relationship between simulations and experiments is infrequently discussed, despite their similarities. In particular, simulations systematically vary individual independent variables, as in typical randomized experiments. In addition, decision units follow rules or a protocol that initiate the data generating process. Of course, there are also notable differences between simulations and experiments. First, role-playing experiments reduce experimenter control, but in this medium researchers can better explore how cognitive factors, such as emotion, affect decision-making. Zinnes 1966 reviews this particular trade-off and assesses its impact for valid inferences. Mahoney and Druckman 1975 supplements this analysis, detailing how role-playing simulations can be used for experimentation. The International Communication and Negotiation Simulations (ICONS) Project maintains a library of role-playing simulation scenarios for these purposes. A second incongruity is that computational experiments, such as agent-based modeling and dynamic simulations, use computer programs, rather than human subjects, to test systemic theories. The connection between computational simulations and causal inference and their systematization, as Pepinsky 2005 explains, makes their inclusion in this review of experimental relevant. Stoll 2005 provides an example of the use of computational simulations in international conflict, along with a justification for their use.

Axelrod, Robert. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Perseus, 1984.

An essential IR text that uses computer tournament simulations to test sustainable strategies in the iterated prisoners' dilemma. Through simulation, rather than mathematical deduction or econometrics, Axelrod reaches the counter-intuitive observation that cooperation is optimal in repeated play when actors sufficiently value the future and practice reciprocity.

International Communication and Negotiations Simulations (ICONS) Project.

Founded by Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Richard Brecht at the University of Maryland, the ICONS project works with scholars and corporations to development and implement role-playing negotiation simulations for instruction, training, and research purposes. ICONS offers a wide range of simulation scenarios.

Mahoney, Robert, and Daniel Druckman. "Simulation, Experimentation, and Context: Dimensions of Design and Inference." *Simulation & Games* 6 (1975): 235–270.

A comprehensive and technical guide to the use of role-playing simulations for testing IR theory. Differing according to their range, "real world" detail, and precision, the authors categorize five types of simulation designs, four of which are explicitly suited for experimentation and manipulation.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. "From Agents to Outcomes: Simulation in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2005): 367–394.

In this overview of the logic underlying computer simulation, Pepinsky delivers two warnings. Simulations often fail to clarify their epistemological purpose, whether to test theory or formally deduce causal mechanisms. Simulations also adopt ontological assumptions that favor simpler, realist agent–structure notions than might realistically be the case.

Stoll, Richard J. "Civil Reality? Simulation Experiments on the Impact of Civil War in a Realist World." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (2005): 19–38.

Primarily to make a case for the use of computer simulation for theory building, Stoll develops and tests a realist model of the interdependence of civil and interstate war participation. Simulations demonstrate that civil war participation impacts interstate war experiences, with particularly novel findings for governments that lose civil wars.

Zinnes, Dina A. "A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data." *World Politics* 18 (1966): 474–502.

Compares data from a case study of the events leading to the First World War and a laboratory simulation using high school students. Zinnes finds valid comparisons between diplomats and students on cognitive factors but observes that some situational variables (power distributions and communication methods) are less comparable.

Online Labor Markets

A recent technological innovation in laboratory and survey experiments is the creation of online labor markets, that is, forums hosted on the Internet, such as YouGov, GfK Knowledge Networks, and Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk), through which researchers can solicit participation in surveys or online experiments. The advantages of using online labor markets in experimental research, as Iyengar 2011 outlines, are that researchers can cost-effectively recruit a large number of subjects and use multimedia instruments, which are impractical in typical survey designs. Berinsky, et al. 2012 and Horton, et al. 2011 address some of the common concerns about using online labor markets for survey and laboratory experiments.

Amazon Mechanical Turk.

Mechanical Turk (mTurk) is an online labor market hosted by Amazon. Any individual may solicit, or "request," work from human workers in mTurk's market, including participation in surveys, survey experiments, and individual and group decision experiments.

Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk." *Political Analysis* 20 (2012): 351–368.

An empirical assessment of internal and external validity for experiments conducted through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk subjects, apart from age and ideology, are not substantively different from convenience samples in benchmark survey experiments and are minimally prone to protocol violations. Previous experiments replicate sufficiently well with this subject pool.

GfK Knowledge Networks.

GfK Knowledge Networks is an independent polling organization that maintains a nationally representative pool of US survey respondents. Works with government and academic researchers to conduct online surveys and survey experiments.

Horton, John J., David G. Rand, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. "The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market." *Experimental Economics* 14 (2011): 399–425.

A useful guide to the availability and use of online labor markets for experiments. The authors address problems of internal validity (observation independence, attrition), external validity (representativeness, treatment heterogeneity), and ethics particular to this method before presenting successful replications of three classic experiments using subjects recruited from online labor markets.

Iyengar, Shanto. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Science." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 73–88. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Suited to political psychology and communication, briefly reviews the use of experiments in political science. Campaign advertising and policy framing examples illustrate the advantages of laboratory experiments in control over other methods, while addressing concerns about subject pool generality with an in-depth presentation of newer, online subject recruitment tools.

YouGov.

YouGov, formerly Polimetrix in the United States, is an independent polling organization that maintains subject panels in 11 countries. Capable of drawing nationally representative samples in each of these countries, YouGov works with governments, businesses, and researchers to conduct surveys and survey experiments.

Neuroscience

Innovations and improved efficiency in neuroscience research have created opportunities for political psychologists to investigate new questions in human cognition; McDermott 2004 summarizes. These opportunities open the door to interdisciplinary discoveries, but Tingley 2006 warns that certain precautions are necessary before IR scholars proceed too quickly. Nonetheless, neuropolitics is a frontier approach in experimental political science.

McDermott, Rose. "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (2004): 691–706.

A well-explained entreaty on the neuroscientific foundations of emotion for cognition, particularly for describing the interdependence between emotion and economic rationality. McDermott summarizes how emotion affects individual choices before, during, and after decision opportunities. An argument for the (re-)integration of emotion-based theories in political science decision-making models concludes.

Tingley, Dustin. "Neurological Imaging as Evidence in Political Science: A Review, Critique, and Guiding Assessment." *Social Science Information* 45 (2006): 5–33.

While upholding the complementarities between political psychology and neuroscience in answering questions about emotion, cognition, and behavior, Tingley heeds caution for collaboration between the fields. In particular, (i) gaps in neuroscience theory limit political science's ability to infer causal mechanisms, and (ii) neuroscience research designs are vulnerable to internal validity problems.

Approaches

Compared to other disciplines that use experimental methods, political science and IR are more inclusive to different epistemological approaches. As Dickson 2011 explains, where economics predominantly focuses on the rational actor model (and efforts to understand

deviations from instrumental rationality) and the outcomes of decision-making, psychology emphasizes the cognitive processes that underlay choice. These different epistemological positions have subsequently led to different methodological approaches to the design and execution of experiments, which Dickson 2011 also explains. Subheadings under this section point to general guides for both experimental economics and political psychology approaches.

Dickson, Eric S. "Economics versus Psychology Experiments: Stylization, Incentives, and Deception." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 58–69. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Compares economics and psychology experimental traditions, with particular emphasis on the areas in which the fields most diverge: scenario stylization, monetary incentives, and deception. Specifically explains the epistemological assumptions upon which the different preferences developed and their implications. Suggests avenues for reconciling the two approaches through experimentation.

Experimental Economics

Experimental economics is best defined as the use of experiments to test the behavioral predictions inferred from equilibrium solutions to economic theories. Morton 1999 guides the reader through the theoretical and methodological steps necessary for testing formal models and emphasizes the advantages of experimental approaches. This text, though, does not provide specific instruction on research design or implementation. In this regard, Kagel and Roth 1995 is widely regarded as the authority.

Kagel, Jack, and Alvin Roth, eds. *Handbook of Experimental Economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Written for the economics field but applicable to IR scholars testing formal or economic theories, this edited volume is an essential guide to the conceptualization and execution of experiments. Organized around substantive topics, such as coordination, bargaining, and decision-making, the text reviews and contextualizes the relevant scholarship.

Morton, Rebecca B. *Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

This concise handbook (i) orients the reader to the use of formal models as theory-building instruments rather than methods in themselves, and (ii) suggests methods of testing deductions from mathematical models. Particular attention is paid to the advantages of laboratory experiments for testing formal theories, alongside more conventional econometric models.

Psychology

Experimental methods to test political psychology theories adopt a wide variety of instruments and examine decision-making at multiple levels of analysis. Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001 provides a highly useful overview of these approaches and their application to IR. McDermott 2009 gives a more thorough and technical treatment of the subject matter; of particular interest for experimental political scientists, McDermott directly addresses the use of experiments. Though experimental political psychology makes use of a variety of instruments, scholars regularly induce particular attitude expressions or decision-making through information that frames or primes an individual's thought. Yet, priming and framing instruments are not without controversy. Druckman 2001 addresses conceptual and methodological inconsistencies in the use of framing instruments. Druckman also confronts one concerning implication of research that uses framing effects, citizen incompetence. Druckman 2004 and Burdein, et al. 2006 provide additional contextual and cognitive evidence that framing and priming effects are susceptible to bias. Both also provide useful recommendations for avoiding these vulnerabilities.

Burdein, Inna, Milton Lodge, and Charles Taber. "Experiments on the Automaticity of Political Beliefs and Attitudes." *Political Psychology* 27 (2006): 359–371.

Relies on neuroscience cognition research to analyze the use of priming effects and surveys in political psychology. Self-reported responses are potentially biased due to automatic thought processes and desire to satisfy social norms. The authors recommend a set of methods to elicit these automatic cognitive processes, averting biased observations.

Druckman, James N. "The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence." *Political Behavior* 23 (2001): 225–256.

A careful and highly instructive discussion on framing instruments in political behavior research. An extensive literature review reveals that the concept of framing is inconsistently applied and, troublingly, that framing effects imply individuals' incompetence, especially compared to elites. Druckman resolves these issues by outlining clear approaches when using framing instruments.

Druckman, James N. "Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects." *American Political Science Review* 98 (2004): 671–686.

Noting the widespread use of framing effects to counter rational choice explanations, Druckman tests whether framing effects are, in fact, robust and pervasive. A series of laboratory experiments test the propositions that counter-framing, group discussion, and experience mitigate framing influences. Results recommend contextual awareness in studying framing and rational decision-making.

Goldgeier, James M., and Phillip E. Tetlock. "Psychology and International Relations Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 67–92.

Goldgeier and Tetlock present a compelling case for the (re-)integration of psychological micro-foundations in grand IR theory (realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism) through thorough synthesis. Though not explicitly a manuscript on experimental psychology, much of the referenced psychological findings refer to experimental studies, making this a useful reference.

McDermott, Rose. *Political Psychology in International Relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009.

A stand-out text on psychological approaches to IR, McDermott summarizes essential concepts before presenting specific applications from psychology for the study of behavior, emotion, leadership, and group processes in IR. For the experimental political psychologist, chapter 2 is an essential introduction; subsequent chapters include useful references to experimental work.

Conflict Processes

The conflict processes field in IR represents an area in which experimental approaches are used across a wide range of substantive questions. This section reviews research on Crisis and War, Nuclear Armament and Disarmament, the Democratic Peace, Terrorism, and Conflict Resolution that implements experimental methods. Both experimental economics approaches and psychological approaches are present. Conflict processes experiments are also methodologically diverse. Laboratory experiments, survey, and simulations are used across the literature. The goal in each of these areas of inquiry is to improve our understanding of political conflict and violence, and experimental IR is responsible for a number of important contributions.

Crisis and War

A significant portion of experimental research in IR is set against the background of crisis and war. Crisis management, for example, is frequently used to motivate subjects in decision-making experiments for foreign policy analysis. Conflict resolution experiments similarly assume the constant threat of war. Even some experiments conducted in international development and domestic politics must deal with the threat of civil and interstate violence. Yet, there are just a small number of projects that use experiments to directly test theories related to the onset and phases of militarized conflict. Beliefs that another country or group poses a security threat are an initial trigger for militarized violence; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007 examines two pervasive theories, realist balance of power and constructivist self/other identities. Herrmann, et al. 1999 further finds that latent realism in public support for the use of force is also conditioned on

individual conflict dispositions. Tingley 2011 and Tingley and Walter 2011 logically follow these analysis of threat perceptions as they test two implications from the rationalist conflict bargaining model: (i) expectations of future interaction can resolve commitment problems that prevent successful peaceful settlements, and (ii) incentives to misrepresent private information about capabilities and resolve make it difficult to deliver credible threats. Testing another expected utility explanation for war, political survival or selectorate theory, Bausch 2014 examines resource mobilization and military victory. While these five papers speak to dominant IR paradigms, Abbink 2012 draws from the economics literature to reach beyond the rationalist conflict bargaining model. This review chapter introduces logical correlates between traditional IR approaches to conflict and dynamic, conflict processes concepts such as the predator–prey model.

Abbink, Klaus. “Laboratory Experiments on Conflict.” In *Oxford Handbook of Economics of Peace and Conflict*. Edited by Michelle R. Garginkel and Stergios Skaperdas, 532–555. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

In economics, experimental approaches to the study of war have only recently been adopted. Abbink traces their origins to rent-seeking and predator–prey models, which are less well represented in experimental IR, but have logical correlates. Abbink also summarizes behavioral economics treatments of revolution, post-conflict settlement, and counterterrorism.

Bausch, Andrew W. “An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory.” *International Interactions* 40 (2014): 533–553.

Tests two implications from selectorate theory: democratic leaders invest in public goods and tend to win wars in which they participate. Incentivized laboratory experiments support democracies’ public goods allocations but fail to demonstrate their propensity to win wars. Permitting communication only differentiates democracies by resource mobilization in conflict, not victory.

Herrmann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser. “Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework.” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 553–573.

Tests the hypotheses that public support for the use of force is informed by realist and geopolitical perceptions of the situation and individuals’ dispositions (e.g., militarism/pacifism, isolationism/interventionism, ideology). Five survey experiments of Americans support the hypotheses; manipulation checks reveal that political knowledge increases the relevance of situational factors.

Rousseau, David L. and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2007): 744–771.

Hypothesizes that perceptions of threat originate from relative capabilities and identity similarity. Three laboratory experiments, one in the United States and two in Spain, find evidence that both factors influence threat perceptions. While the military balance explains the majority of the effect, identity and power are individually and conjointly informative.

Tingley, Dustin H. “The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining.” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 521–544.

Formal model and test of competing claims about the relationship between repeated interactions and the evolution of cooperation; the “dark side of the future” suggests that repeated interactions exacerbate commitment problems, precipitating war. Results from an incentivized laboratory experiment support the non-cooperative prediction: long-time horizons prompt preventive warlike behavior.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. “The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach.” *International Organization* 65 (2011): 343–365.

A straightforward incentivized laboratory experiment on the influence of cheap talk in entry-deterrence games poses counter-intuitive findings: (i) costless threats deterred attacks, particularly in low information contexts; (ii) actors carried out threats, even when bluffing did not harm reputations; and (iii) successful “cheap talk” possibly explained by heterogeneity of strategic skill.

Nuclear Armament and Disarmament

Given the catastrophic consequences of nuclear warfare, scientific inquiry into possible ways to reduce nuclear proliferation, expedite disarmament, and deescalate crises between nuclear states is of highly practical value. Systematic empirical tests of nuclear politics theories are difficult, though, because there are relatively few nuclear powers and just a singular case of nuclear weapons used in warfare. Partly for these reasons, experiments and simulations have been an important testing ground for theories on nuclear politics since the 1960s. The earliest research, as demonstrated in Bonham 1971, used simulations to assess the effects of different situational factors and procedural rules on negotiation. More recent work takes advantage of the control of laboratory experiments and surveys to test theory. In sum, experimental approaches have been used to examine questions about nuclear proliferation (McDermott, et al. 2002), nuclear warfare (Press, et al. 2013; Simon 2004), and disarmament (Bonham 1971). One persistent challenge for experimental research on nuclear politics, however, is establishing experimental realism in the laboratory. While some decision-making processes can be faithfully replicated, realistically simulating or inducing the costs of nuclear warfare confound current research. Simon 2004 discusses the issue in more detail.

Bonham, G. Matthew. "Simulating International Disarmament Negotiations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (1971): 299–315.

A bedrock study on the effects of conflicts of interest in disarmament negotiations using the negotiation simulation role-playing protocol. Experimental treatments induced conflicts of interest through emphasis on different issues (arms reduction vs. inspection), which increased hostility, reduced reciprocity, but had no significant effect on concessions.

McDermott, Rose, Jonathan Cowden, and Cheryl Koopman. "Framing, Uncertainty, and Hostile Communications in a Crisis Experiment." *Political Psychology* 23 (2002): 133–149.

A laboratory crisis simulation tests the effects of three psychological variables, security framing, capabilities uncertainty, and message hostility, on defense spending. Subjects acquired more arms when crisis scenarios emphasized capabilities superiority for security and when adversaries exchanged hostile messages. Counterintuitively, uncertainty about capabilities had no effect on armament expenditure.

Press, Daryl G., Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." *American Political Science Review* 107 (2013): 188–206.

Online survey experiments investigate the micro-foundations of American support for the use of nuclear weapons. Comparing threat characteristics and decision time, Americans are generally averse to the use of nuclear weapons but give latitude when framed in terms of military strategy. Results do not support pervasive perceptions of nuclear taboos.

Simon, Michael. "Asymmetric Proliferation and Nuclear War: The Limited Usefulness of an Experimental Test." *International Interactions* 30 (2004): 69–85.

A probative laboratory experiment tests competing claims about capabilities asymmetries and nuclear war. Consistent with power transition theory, Simon finds that nuclear asymmetries produced war outcomes more often than balanced nuclear and non-nuclear dyads. Questions about experimental realism raise important reservations about the generalizability of these findings, however.

Democratic Peace

The empirical regularity of the democratic peace inspired some to declare optimistically, albeit with reservation, the nonviolent relationship between democracies to nearly have the status of scientific law. Yet early attempts to explain the robust correlation between democracy and peace generated multiple, though not exclusive, causal pathways. More recent observational research, moreover, raises the possibility that the democratic peace is an artifact of spurious correlation between democracy and trade, affinity, or territorial stability. These challenges have paved the way for experimental research. Mintz and Geva 1993 is among the first to use experiments to test competing normative and institutional explanations of the dyadic democratic peace. Tomz and Weeks 2013 similarly uses a survey experiment to test the prevalence of normative and institutional explanations for the dyadic democratic peace. In addition, Geva and Hanson 1999 and Lacina

and Lee 2013 analyze the democratic peace argument against its common alternatives in an effort to eliminate spurious correlation. Though the dyadic democratic peace has received the greatest scrutiny from experimental and other empirical research, scholars have also given systematic treatment to the democratic peace at other levels of analysis. For example, Cedarman and Gleditsch 2004 uses computational simulations to experiment with the conditions necessary to support the systemic democratic peace.

Cedarman, Lars-Erik, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Conquest and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democracy and Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 603–629.

Uses agent-based modeling as computational experiments to test counterfactual claims. Simulations test three systemic democratic peace explanations: natural selection, regional regime transition, and collective security. Results show that neither natural selection nor regional clustering necessarily explains the democratic peace, but that collective security is a plausible, though not sufficient, factor.

Geva, Nehemia, and D. Christopher Hanson. "Cultural Similarity, Foreign Policy Actions, and Regime Perception: An Experimental Study of International Cues and Democratic Peace." *Political Psychology* 20 (1999): 803–827.

Addresses a necessary condition for the democratic peace that regime type is clearly perceptible. Student and nonstudent adult subjects described socio-culturally similar countries as more democratic in two laboratory experiments. These perceptions conditioned support for armed force, raising questions for the application of the democratic peace to "third wave" democracies.

Lacina, Bethany, and Charlotte Lee. "Culture Clash or Democratic Peace? Results of a Survey Experiment on the Effect of Religious Culture and Regime Type of Foreign Policy Opinion Formation." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9 (2013): 143–170.

Two survey experiments of American adults test the microfoundations of the critique that the democratic peace is an artifact of Western cultural similarity and affinity. Results initially support the critical hypothesis. Subjects expressed less threat from Christian and democratic targets, though democracy and religion predominantly worked in tandem, not independently.

Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. "Why Don't Democracies Fight with Each Other: An Experimental Study." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993): 484–503.

Proposes an alternative democratic peace explanation: attacks against other democracies generate less approval, diminishing incentives to use force. Laboratory experiments using three populations (American students, American non-student adults, and Israeli students) support the theory's micro-foundations. Use of force against democracies was perceived as a foreign policy failure and garnered less support.

Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 107 (2013): 849–865.

Online survey experiments test democratic peace arguments, along with economic, alignment, and security alternatives. US and UK respondents had significantly less support for strikes against a democracy in a hypothetical nuclear proliferation scenario. Democracy's effects primarily mediated by perceptions of threat and morality, not costs or likelihood of success.

Terrorism

Because reliable data on terrorist organizations and the individual perpetrators of terrorism are difficult to obtain and, yet, the incidence of terrorism appears to be growing, experiments are a valuable method for studying terrorism in IR. As Arce, et al. 2011 reviews, there are a number of strategic games that map well to terrorism and counterterrorism that also have a record of experimental analysis. Alongside these experimental economics approaches to the study of terrorism, there is also a substantial record of research that uses experiments to test psychological decision-making theories and other deviations from the rational actor model. Studying terrorism from the view of its perpetrators, Abrahms 2013 tests which terrorist strategies convey threat credibility and result in more coercive influence. Bausch, et al. 2013 and Healy, et al. 2002 investigate two different types of terrorism responses. On one hand, Bausch, et al. 2013 studies how

governments can mitigate the psychological trauma that impact domestic stability after terrorist attack. On the other hand, Healy, et al. 2002 studies military responses and finds that individuals tolerate greater use of force when retaliating against a terrorist attack than when retaliating against a conventional, state-initiated attack.

Abrahms, Max. "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013): 660–671.

An innovative survey experiment of voting-age Americans that tests the "credibility paradox" in the rationalist utility of terrorism. Terrorist-like civilian killing, compared to less violent hostage-taking, better demonstrates resolve but also positions the group as more extreme. Extremism, counterintuitively, leads to less coercion or willingness to compromise among survey respondents.

Arce, Daniel G., Rachel T. A. Croson, and Catherine C. Eckel. "Terrorism Experiments." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2011): 373–382.

An in-depth review of experimental economics research on terrorism. Taking an interdisciplinary (economics and political science) view, the authors identify four major games at which formal theory and laboratory experiments intersect—interdependent security investment, Colonel Blotto, global security/free-riding, and punishment/vendetta—and list their findings and logical extensions.

Bausch, Andrew W., Jaoa R. Faria, and Thomas Zeitzoff. "Warnings, Terrorist Threats and Resilience: A Laboratory Experiment." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30 (2013): 433–451.

Results from an incentivized laboratory experiment reveal a useful counterterrorism policy recommendation: To belay the indirect, psychological harms to domestic stability, governments should disperse precise information about terrorist threats. These results and the underlying formal game-theoretic model correspond with extant research but interestingly show non-monotonicity between information and citizen reactions.

Healy, Alice, Joshua Hoffman, Francis Beer, and Lyle Bourne. "Terrorism and Democrats: Individual Reactions to International Attacks." *Political Psychology* 23 (2002): 439–467.

Three laboratory experiments investigate responses to terrorist attacks. Experiments manipulate a battery of attacking-actor characteristics (attribution, regime, relationship, target) in addition to subject attributes in an image-based, decision-making approach. Most noteworthy, subjects responded with more conflict to terrorist attacks than military attacks, particularly those against military targets.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is generally defined as any nonviolent attempt to bring a crisis or dispute to an end. Thus, conflict resolution encompasses a wide range of strategies (e.g., negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication), actors (e.g., diplomats, states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations), and outcomes (e.g., stalemate, cease fire, settlement, dispute termination). As Druckman 2011 explains in a review of negotiation and mediation research, many scholars have adopted one of two strategies to study the complex bargaining interactions of conflict resolution: case studies or experiments. Experiments, in particular, allow researchers to manipulate theoretical variables and have proved instrumental for testing conflict management theories and their counterfactual claims. One important methodology in this experimental tradition in conflict resolution is the role-playing simulation. Wilkenfeld 2004 gives a semi-autobiographical account of the implementation of role-playing simulations and simulations are used in Druckman 1993 and Wilkenfeld, et al. 2003. The three empirical papers in this section attempt to answer two questions: What effect does mediation have on conflict resolution? Once a dispute is initially resolved, do those agreements have any effect on future clashes? Druckman 1993 finds that mediation efficacy depends, in part, on negotiators' willingness to compromise, suggesting that mediation alone cannot effect peaceful settlement. Wilkenfeld, et al. 2003 builds on this observation and finds that mediator success also depends on the mediation strategy. Beer, et al. 1995 looks to conflict prevention and investigate whether the presence of a peace agreement, alone, reduces hostility in crises between rivals.

Beer, Francis, Grant Sinclair, Alice Healy, and Lyle Bourne. "Peace Agreement, Intractable Conflict, Escalation Trajectory: A Psychological Laboratory Experiment." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995): 297–312.

Laboratory experiments test the effect of peace treaties on rivalry crisis management. Contrary to institutionalist expectations, peace agreements did not significantly reduce response hostility in the hypothetical crisis; instead, subjects responded with reciprocal, but moderated and bounded, force. Additional tests found personality and gender traits to mediate response hostility.

Druckman, Daniel. "The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993): 236–276.

One of Druckman's most-cited negotiation processes articles. Investigates flexibility framing and mediation in a hypothetical environmental negotiation role-playing simulation, using professional (scientists and diplomats) subjects. Conditions permitting negotiator flexibility facilitated concessions necessary to reach agreement; flexibility prevailed as a main effect as mediation did not improve negotiations among inflexible negotiators.

Druckman, Daniel. "Negotiation and Mediation." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 413–429. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

A comprehensive review of the literature that identifies convergence between laboratory findings and case studies. Laboratory experiments in negotiation and mediation make several contributions: isolating causal mechanisms in distributive bargaining and complex settings, resolving empirical puzzles in integrative bargaining, and identifying preferences for mediation over negotiation.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Kathleen Young, Victor Asal, and David Quinn. "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (2003): 279–301.

A rare multimethod research strategy tests the effects of mediation on crisis management. Observational data demonstrate the efficacy of mediation for settling crises. A role-playing simulation experiment with student subjects confirms this observation and further reveals that mediation style matters: manipulative approaches generally brought about better outcomes.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "Reflections on Simulation and Experimentation in the Study of Negotiation." *International Negotiation* 9 (2004): 429–439.

A cautiously optimistic review of the use of experiments and simulations for the study of crisis management told through the author's personal experiences. Summaries of two role-playing simulation experiments reveal experiments' promise for answering difficult questions and the training that Wilkenfeld believes is not yet ingrained in IR training.

Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy analysis traces its roots to the study of individual- and group-level decision-making. In overview of the foreign policy analysis subfield, Hudson 2005 explains that much of the theoretical work in foreign policy analysis is premised on psychological and neurological theories about cognition and information processing. Hudson 2005 also notes other innovations that introduce group-level bureaucratic and governmental processes. Because these processes are difficult to directly observe and because the subjects of interest, foreign policy elites, are in most cases inaccessible, foreign policy analysis quickly became a natural candidate for experimental research in the tradition of experimental psychology. Hermann and Ozkececi-Taner 2011 gives a general overview, with detailed attention to a few noteworthy examples of experimental research in foreign policy decision-making. The remainder of this section is divided into three subsections. Prospect Theory briefly introduces the experimental research on this predominant alternative to the rational actor model in foreign policy decision-making. Decision-Making reviews some of the experimental research on other individual and group cognitive processing theories: bounded rationality, heuristics, and bureaucratic processes. Leader Traits focuses on research that tests decision-making theories based on more latent cognitive processes, including emotion, personality, and biological markers.

Hermann, Margaret G., and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner. "The Experiment and Foreign Policy Decision Making." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 430–442. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Through detailed reviews of primarily laboratory and simulation experiments, the authors highlight the major contributions of experiments to foreign policy analysis. They argue that experiments on decision maker beliefs, decision context/framing, and intra-group processes access information that is otherwise difficult for foreign policy researchers to obtain.

Hudson, Valerie M. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and Ground of International Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 1–30.

This introductory article to the first issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* provides a comprehensive and chronological review of the study of foreign policy decision-making. Hudson conceptualizes individual and group decision units as the foundational source of international interactions when proscribing the scope and value of foreign policy analysis.

Prospect Theory

Among decision-making approaches, prospect theory provides one of the most compelling alternatives to the rational actor model. Levy 1997 gives a comprehensive comparison of the two approaches and discusses the potential applications of prospect theory to IR research. Much of the initial enthusiasm surrounding prospect theory began with experimental results from Kahneman and Tversky 1979, written by economists, that demonstrated several violations of the rational actor model in individual decision-making. Later, Thaler, et al. 1997 finds further experimental evidence of pervasive risk aversion in individual decision makers. Though prospect theory remains a promising alternative to the rational actor model, research in political science has not consistently replicated the results of Thaler, et al. 1997. In a series of papers, Boettcher (Boettcher 1995; Boettcher 2004a; Boettcher 2004b) finds limitations in the application of prospect theory to IR. He concludes that prospect theory performs better when experiments more closely approximate the original research design in Kahneman and Tversky 1979; manipulations to better fit the context or actions relevant to IR decision-making introduce substantial deviations.

Boettcher, William A. III. "Context, Methods, Numbers, and Words." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (1995): 561–583.

Identifies a crucial inference problem when using case studies to test prospect theory hypotheses: Risk probabilities are not easily separated from decision makers' preferences. Laboratory experiments replicate Kahneman and Tversky 1979 in a foreign policy context but fail to find similar results whether risk probabilities were expressed verbally or numerically.

Boettcher, William A. III. "Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004a): 331–355.

Laboratory experiments using student participants test the theoretical framing effects of prospect theory in the setting of humanitarian military intervention. Boettcher finds mixed evidence of preference reversals or shifts. Of methodological interest, the experiments also demonstrate that the types of actions available in forced choice experiments affect choices.

Boettcher, William A. III. "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion." *Political Psychology* 25 (2004b): 331–362.

Capitalizes on three laboratory experiments to rigorously evaluate prospect theory assumptions and their application in political science. The focal observation Boettcher tests is preference reversal; he finds mixed support. Preference reversal and framing effects are capable of being induced in the lab, but context and design are essential.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 263–292.

The foundational study on prospect theory. The authors execute a series of laboratory experiments in Israel, Sweden, and the United States, which demonstrate systematic violations of the expected utility, or rational actor. Specifically, the authors find that choices are a function of risk frames (losses or gains) and decision weights.

Levy, Jack S. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 87–112.

Levy thoroughly evaluates expected utility and prospect theory as decision-making models for IR. Much of the traction for prospect theory as an alternative approach draws from a well-documented experimental tradition; however, Levy cautions against naïve adoption of the theory out of concern for external validity in experimental methods.

Thaler, Richard H., Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Alan Schwartz. "The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1997): 647–661.

Early research on prospect theory using laboratory experiments with student subjects. The authors test two propositions: decision makers are more risk acceptant when they receive information less frequently and when payoffs are great enough to mitigate perceptions of losses. Empirical support provided the basis for subsequent political science applications.

Decision-Making

Outside the field of foreign policy analysis, a significant portion of the assumptions about decision-making is based on the rational actor model, but, at for least economics experiments, the rational actor model has not fared well when tested with human subjects. Instead, behavioral economics and political psychology posit that many decision settings, such as a nuclear crisis, are too complex for individuals to process the vast amount of information. Experiments on individual and group decision-making verify this assumption and demonstrate that decision makers employ a number of decision rules that simplify the information environment. For example, Herrmann, et al. 1997 argues that stereotypes are a common cognitive construct and finds that these stereotypes influence information processing and choices. Prospect theory, reviewed separately, offers an alternative account of this bounded rationality, in which decision makers rely on risk frames to assess choices, rather than stereotype images. Where stereotypes and risk frames are often formed before an individual encounters a decision, Geva, et al. 2000 and Mintz 2004 show that decision makers can also employ simplifying heuristics during a choice setting to more efficiently process information and make choices. The two sets of authors offer different accounts of these simplifying steps, but both agree that how individuals process information is an important factor in policy choice. Another instrument used to make information processing simpler is to distribute the information load across an organization or cabinet. Yet, this introduces inefficiencies related to group decision-making, which Christensen and Redd 2004 and Redd 2002 explore by examining policy advisers' influence.

Christensen, Eben J., and Steven B. Redd. "Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004): 69–90.

A laboratory experiment using undergraduate students tests whether presidents, working with their cabinets, are more influenced by bureaucratic politics or cognitive shortcuts when making foreign policy decisions. Evidence supports a poliheuristic view of cabinet influence, though the presence of multiple, disagreeing advisers may indirectly inform choices.

Geva, Nehemia, James Mayhar, and J. Mark Skorick. "The Cognitive Calculus of Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Assessment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (2000): 447–471.

Tests a novel decision-making theory that incorporates cognitive information processing and choice. In a process tracing experiment, information valence and relevance are manipulated. Results support the computationally derived hypotheses that individuals exposed to more relevant and directed information engage in less information searching and make corresponding decisions.

Herrmann, Richard K., James F. Voss, Tonya Y. E. Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi. "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 403–433.

Detailed analysis of four images or stereotypes, enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate, through three laboratory experiments using undergraduate student subjects. The authors find support for the coherence of enemy, ally, and colony images and their independent, cognitive effects on perceptions of threat and opportunity and policy choices.

Mintz, Alex. "Foreign Policy Decision Making in Familiar and Unfamiliar Settings: An Experimental Study of High-Ranking Military Officers." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004): 91–104.

Explores the cognitive effects of unfamiliarity and ambiguity on foreign policy decision-making. Results from the process tracing experiment, employing Air Force officers as subjects, support the theory; subjects used more cognitive short cuts in unfamiliar and ambiguous settings. This study points to compelling policy implications and applications for poliheuristic theory.

Redd, Steven B. "The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Study." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002): 335–364.

Investigates foreign policy adviser importance and order on decisions to use military force in an illustrative process tracing experiment. Tests of three poliheuristic decision processes (dimensional, noncompensatory, order-sensitive search) indicate that advisers induce noncompensatory and dimensional decision rules, which affect policy choices but do not influence choices themselves.

Leader Traits

Research that studies leader traits, such as personality, psychology, and neurology, offers an alternative explanation for decision-making. Where heuristic and bureaucratic theories explain decision-making as an information-processing problem, research in this field argues that underlying cognitive function (the ability to process information) and preference formation are conditioned on latent, innate characteristics. Nonetheless, trait-focused decision-making models benefit as much from experimental methodology and even make use of new technologies, such as brain imaging and biological marker testing. Within this tradition, research on the role of personality has the longest history as IR scholars collaborated with psychologists to analyze personality types, such as dominant-submissive and experimentation-conservatism. Beer, et al. 1987 is a good example of this type of research, and Keller and Yang 2008, in later work, integrates personality variables with poliheuristic theory. More recently, scholars have embedded other latent cognitive factors in experimental analyses of decision-making. Druckman and McDermott 2008, for instance, uses a framing instrument to induce discrete emotions in subjects before inviting them to participate in a decision-making scenario. In another study that integrates insight from neuroscience, Johnson, et al. 2006 researches the pervasiveness and consequences of overconfidence to draw implications for international conflict.

Beer, Francis A., Alice F. Healy, Grant P. Sinclair, and Lyle E. Bourne Jr. "War Cues and Foreign Policy Acts." *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987): 701–715.

Studies the effects of message priming on crisis responses. Laboratory experiments with undergraduate students test whether violent or nonviolent cues activate militarism or passivism. Results demonstrate an interaction between the priming condition and dominant-submissive personality types; a politically relevant implication that assertive personalities are "triggered" only by particular cues.

Druckman, James N., and Rose McDermott. "Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice." *Political Behavior* 30 (2008): 297–321.

Draws from neuroscience and psychology research on emotion's role in cognition to examine framing effects. Results from two laboratory experiments demonstrate that discrete emotions (anger, enthusiasm, distress) direct risk-seeking/aversion and temper the influence of risk frames. Conclusions also point to decision context and gender as factors in risk framing susceptibility.

Johnson, Dominic D. P., Rose McDermott, Emily S. Barrett, Jonathan Cowden, Richard Wrangham, Matthew H. McIntyre, and Stephen Peter Rosen. "Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender and Testosterone." *Proceedings: Biological Sciences/The Royal Society* 273 (2006): 2513–2520.

Synthesizes biological and psychological theories to test for the presence and effects of "positive illusions," or overconfidence, on crisis decision-making. Results from the computerized crisis simulation experiment, in which subjects also submitted testosterone samples, revealed pervasive, gender-driven overconfidence. Overconfidence corresponded with unprovoked attacks and war in the simulation.

Keller, Jonathan W., and Yi Edward Yang. "Leadership Style, Decision Context, and the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2008): 687–712.

Expands the poliheuristic decision-making model to investigate the thresholds at which actors disregard political factors in crisis responses. Laboratory experiments support the theory that adversaries' provocations and individual, constraint-resister leadership traits lead subjects to dismiss political factors. Gender was also revealed to play a significant role.

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics approaches in IR answer questions based on the internal characteristics of a state, including its governmental and societal compositions. Experiments have proven to be useful in the study of these subjects as they allow researchers to (i) randomize treatments in the laboratory that they may not safely or ethically perform in the field, (ii) tap into public attitudes that would be prone to social desirability biases in standard surveys, and (iii) work with policy organizations in politically relevant ways. This section on the use of experiments in domestic politics is divided into three subsections: Public Opinion, Audience Costs, and Democratization. Unsurprisingly, much of the experimental research on domestic politics focuses on democracies and democratizing countries, but Bush and Jamal 2015 (cited under Democratization) is noteworthy exception.

Public Opinion

Though there remains healthy skepticism whether the public has enough political knowledge to form sophisticated opinions on foreign policy issues and whether those opinions have any influence on national foreign policy leaders, leaders make statements that suggest attentiveness to public concerns, and many domestic politics approaches (e.g., selectorate theory, democratic peace) rest on the assumption that public opinion matters. Therefore, understanding how public foreign policy opinions form is an important question that has been addressed extensively through survey and laboratory experiments. Indeed, almost 40 percent of the empirical research projects in this bibliography use survey experiments that tap into individual-level foreign policy attitudes. Thus, this section introduces research that examines foreign policy attitude formation, rather than opinions on specific issues. Lavine, et al. 1996 specifically addresses the limited relevance of foreign policy for public opinion. Nonetheless, Kertzer and McGraw 2012 finds that Americans construct consistent foreign policy attitudes through attachment to operational versions of traditional IR paradigms. The remaining articles explore two major cleaves in public opinion: culture and class. Dragojlovic 2015 and Johns 2009 test whether elites shape public foreign policy opinions. Rubenzer and Redd 2010 explores the opposite causal pathway, the influence of racial and ethnic identity groups over American foreign policy. Together, these three articles suggest that questions remain regarding the ability of powerful political actors to influence foreign policy. Indeed, while Dragojlovic 2015 finds support for refugee quotas with elite cues, Johns 2009 does not observe a systematic effect for elite cues on foreign policy attitudes. Key differences focus on the specific type of heuristic triggered and the political knowledge of the targeted audience. Results from all three studies point to the role of individuals' prior political awareness.

Dragojlovic, Nick. "Listening to Outsiders: The Impact of Messenger Nationality on Transnational Persuasion in the United States." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2015): 73–85.

A simple test of messenger identity on American attitudes toward policy change, in this case, refugee quotas. The nationally representative online survey experiment finds foreign advocates are more persuasive with Democrats than Republicans, but this effect fades with respondent political awareness. Indicates potential polarizing consequences of foreign interference.

Johns, Robert. "Tracing Foreign Policy Decisions: A Study of Citizens' Use of Heuristics." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 11 (2009): 574–592.

Adopts a process tracing method to investigate the use and effectiveness of delegation heuristics in foreign policy opinion formation. Few subjects among the British sample sought opinion leader endorsements; those who did were divided between less effective, simple cues and more effective, complex information searches.

Kertzer, Joshua D., and Kathleen M. McGraw. "Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012): 245–258.

Comparing with studies on internationalist/isolationist political attitudes, an intuitive but previously overlooked study of the foundations of realist thinking among the masses. Laboratory experiments reveal significant prevalence of a modified type of realist thinking among non-elites, but one that is only conditionally motivated by classic realist mechanisms, uncertainty and fear.

Lavine, Howard, John L. Sullivan, Eugene Borgida, and Cynthia J. Thomsen. "The Relationship of National and Personal Issue Salience to Attitude Accessibility on Foreign and Domestic Policy Issues." *Political Psychology* 17 (1996): 293–316.

Written for a political behavior audience, the authors demonstrate that individuals' ability recall information (construct accessibility) interacts with personal and national issue salience. Of particular IR relevance, the simple laboratory experiment finds attitudes more accessible on domestic issues than foreign issues because they are perceived to carry greater personal impact.

Rubenzon, Trevor, and Steven B. Redd. "Ethnic Minority Groups and US Foreign Policy: Examining Congressional Decision Making and Economic Sanctions." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010): 755–777.

Two laboratory experiments explore ethnic minorities' influence over congressional foreign policy. Experimental findings corroborate comparisons between the strong influence of smaller Cuban- and Israeli-American groups and weaker, larger Mexican- and African-American groups, which indicate that organization and propensity to vote matter more than critical mass or sympathetic ethnic factors.

Audience Costs

One important domestic politics hypothesis is that leaders, especially democratic leaders, are selective about the types of conflicts they enter and only make threats when they intend to follow through. This is because domestic groups will interpret military losses and bluffs as evidence of the leader's incompetence, assume the costs of war are too great and that the country's reputation has been harmed, and subsequently remove the leader from power in the next election. This "domestic audience costs" theory is predicated on two necessary conditions: (i) the public is attentive to foreign policy issues and forms attitudes about policies based on relative costs, and (ii) these assessments translate into disapproval for the leadership. The five papers reviewed in this section conduct experiments to test these two assumptions of audience costs. Tomz 2007 is widely regarded as the first project to demonstrate that leader approval decreases following failed attempts to bluff. Davies and Johns 2013 extends the experiment of Tomz 2007 to parliamentary democracies, replicating the study in the United Kingdom. Kertzer and Brutger 2015 further separates the reactions that generate audience costs, incompetence and belligerence. Results from Kertzer and Brutger 2015 supports earlier work by Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, which updates earlier audience costs scholarship with evidence that leaders sometimes benefit from backing down. After the decision to use force, the public continues to assess the leader's competence and resolve by observing the costs of war relative to military successes. Gartner 2011 tests this assumption through a unique analysis of the casualty sensitivity hypothesis, finding that how war costs are portrayed informs individual evaluations. The final logical step for audience cost arguments, that democratic publics remove leaders from power due to foreign policy failures, remains an open opportunity for experimental research.

Davies, Graeme A. M., and Robert Johns. "Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013): 725–737.

Replicates the Tomz 2007 study of audience costs resulting from failed foreign policy bluffs in a survey experiment using British subjects. The authors support the original conjecture that foreign policy failures reduce leaders' approval, and add that this effect is conditional on the crisis type and subjects' strategic culture.

Gartner, Scott S. "On Behalf of a Grateful Nation: Conventionalized Images of Loss and Individual Opinion Change in War." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 545–561.

Explains the role of media imagery on public support for war, specifically focusing on image content as a signal of war costs. Laboratory experiments using undergraduate student subjects support the central hypothesis. Imagery conditions individual estimations of the costs and acceptability of war, though partisanship limits this effect.

Kertzer, Joshua D., and Ryan Brutger. "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* Forthcoming (2015): 1–16.

Refines the audience cost experiments literature by separating the mechanisms that generate audience costs: inconsistency and belligerence. A survey experiment finds evidence for both mechanisms, though perceived inconsistency generates more costs. In addition, a disposition battery reveals heterogeneity in audience costs according to militancy, reputation, honor, and ideology.

Levendusky, Matthew S., and Michael C. Horowitz. "When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs." *Journal of Politics* 74 (2012): 323–338.

Investigates three domestic political factors that alter the magnitude of audience costs: partisanship, elite consensus, and private information. Participants in the online survey experiment were less likely to punish presidents that backed down from military threats in light of new information. Partisan and elites cues were less influential.

Tomz, Michael. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61 (2007): 821–840.

A pivotal study on the micro-foundations of audience costs for threat credibility. Three survey experiments show that public disapproval grows when presidents bluff; these costs are greater when leaders back down from the use force over mere threats. Harm to reputation cited as the primary reason for changes in approval.

Democratization

Within democracies, public opinion is a potentially significant constraint on foreign policy decision-making. More generally, though, regime type stands as another important constraining factor. Therefore regime characteristics, including the nature and stability of their institutions, form the basis of many questions related to security, peace, and human rights. Leveraging the promise from the democratic peace literature, a great deal of research focuses on democratic transitions, an area to which experimental research has recently made significant contributions. In particular, new democracies are observed elsewhere to be susceptible to civil and interstate violence. Collier and Vicente 2013 and Hyde 2010 provide some meso-level insights into electoral violence and fraud and use field experiments to test possible instruments to circumvent these risks. The vulnerability of new democracies also warrants interest in democratic transitions. While macro-level observational research provides some answers for successful democratization, Bush and Jamal 2015 uses a survey experiment to investigate a specific micro-foundation: attitudes toward gender equality in authoritarian countries.

Bush, Sarah Sunn, and Amaney A. Jamal. "Anti-Americanism, Authoritarian Politics, and Attitudes about Women's Representation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Jordan." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2015): 34–45.

Examines the efficacy, and potential backlash, of elite cues on attitudes toward democratic reforms in autocracies using a survey experiment in Jordan that manipulated the reform messenger's identity (local imams vs. American foreign officials). Neither messenger

treatment affected respondents' support; support for the authoritarian regime predicted attitudes.

Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *The Economic Journal* 124 (2013): 327–355.

A field experiment on the effects of community-based campaigning on reducing electoral violence in the Nigeria. Specifically, the study tests and finds support for improvements in individual voter turnout, perceptions of safety, and actual violence when anti-violence campaigns educate voters and lower barriers to collective action against intimidation.

Hyde, Susan D. "Experimenting in Democracy Promotion: International Observers and the 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia." *Perspectives on Politics* 8 (2010): 511–527.

A novel study on the effects of election monitors for democratization that has practical, theoretical, and instructive value. A field experiment, coordinated with an international nongovernmental organization, and finds that monitors significantly contributed to election quality. This study points contributes to theory development where observational data reliability is problematic.

Political Economy

Much like the broader economics discipline, international political economy (IPE) has been welcoming to experimental methodologies for a substantial length of time. In a review of the literature and introduction to an *International Interactions* special issue on survey and experimental research, Jensen, et al. 2014 traces the IPE experimental tradition to the 1960s. Given the variety of IPE research that uses experimental methods, this section is divided into four subsections: Trade, Globalization, Investment, Development, and Foreign Aid. Among these areas, the greatest amount of experimental research has been conducted on trade and globalization, particularly attitudes toward protectionism and immigration. In research on development, new field experiments bridge the gap between researchers and policymakers.

Jensen, Nathan M., Bumba Mukherjee, and William T. Bernhard. "Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy." *International Interactions* 40 (2014): 287–304.

This introduction to the *International Interactions* special issue on experimental IPE chronicles the field's surprisingly long history of experimental and survey research. The authors highlight contributions to theory development, policy testing, and, particularly, microfoundations discoveries. Implications from this introduction especially relevant to survey experiments, though some comments are more general.

Trade

Much of the research on international trade is motivated by (neo)liberalism; thus, a prevailing puzzle is why so many countries engage in imbalanced or protectionist trade policies. The projects reviewed in this section attempt to solve this puzzle by examining trade behavior at the national and subnational levels of analysis. In a classic example of experimental economics, Butler, et al. 2007 uses laboratory experiments to test equilibrium solutions from two bargaining games and apply their results to examples from interstate negotiations in political economy where beginning positions and bargaining power affected negotiation outcomes. Yet, foreign policy decision makers negotiating international trade deals are effectively playing a two-level game where they must also take into account domestic reactions to trade liberalization. Evidence from Herrmann, et al. 2001 suggests that managing the multiple interests of the administration, negotiating partners, and the public is complex; political elites tend to follow different intuitions about trade liberalization than the masses. Moreover, it remains unresolved from the extant research whether the public is susceptible to elites' strategic framing of trade policies: Hiscox 2006 and Ardanaz, et al. 2013 conduct framing experiments in the United States and Argentina, respectively, and find that primes intended to induce pro- or anti-trade sentiments are highly conditional. Naoi and Kume 2011 and Ehrlich and Hearn 2014 add that identity cleavages further divide issue framing in trade liberalization: identifying as a consumer, a produce, or both affects support for protectionism and subsidies.

Further, little systematic evidence from this research finds that the public is entirely economically self-interested in their reactions to trade policies; many are influenced by the costs of liberalization relative to those of others countries, as investigated by Jensen and Shin 2014.

Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto. "Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *International Organization* 67 (2013): 411–437.

Replicates Hiscox 2006 with a survey experiment in Argentina. Results not only reinforce the previous study's conclusions but also provide evidence of material interests as a component of attitude. Education indirectly mediates trade attitudes, acting as a proxy for skill, which informs prior beliefs about the distributive consequences of trade.

Butler, Christopher K., Mary J. Bellman, and Oraz A. Kichiyev. "Assessing Power in Spatial Bargaining: When Is There Advantage to Being Status-Quo Advantaged?" *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007): 607–623.

A novel incentivized, laboratory experiment test of two bargaining models relevant to political economy: the full-information, Nash and Milner's incomplete information, which features a focal status quo point. Results show that Nash is a special case of Milner's model and that starting positions influence bargaining outcomes.

Ehrlich, Sean D., and Eddie Hearn. "Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (2014): 149–164.

Tests an individual-level implication of the embedded liberalism thesis: compensating the costs of trade liberalization, such as outsourcing and unemployment, shifts attitudes toward trade openness. Results from the survey experiment highlight a conditional effect of compensation; expectations of compensation improved attitudes among low-income earners but reduced support among high-income respondents.

Herrmann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Matthew N. Diascro. "How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001): 191–218.

A test of the prevalence of three IR theories—neorealism, liberalism, and Rawlsian distributive justice—in American trade intuitions. Survey experiments of the American public and, uniquely, leaders reveal a mass/elite cleavage. Leaders follow liberal intuitions about trade more than the predominantly neorealist and redistributive masses, regardless of partisanship.

Hiscox, Michael J. "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing." *International Organization* 60 (2006): 755–780.

A pair of survey experiments instructively demonstrate how question framing affects trade attitudes. Negative frames led to more anti-trade sentiment but were mediated by the authority of pro-trade endorsements and respondent education. Results also suggest that anti-trade sentiment may be overstated in surveys that do not take framing into account.

Jensen, Nathan M., and Mi Jeong Shin. "Globalization and Domestic Trade Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies." *International Interactions* 40 (2014): 305–324.

A microfoundations-based explanation for trade protectionism, particularly for agriculture, compared with institutions and collective action. A survey experiment of US citizens supports the hypothesis that strategic issue framing, describing US subsidies as less generous than other countries, increases individual support. Results are not robust but highly suggestive for future research.

Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession." *International Organization* 65 (2011): 771–795.

Targets two limitations of research on domestic trade policy preferences: individual preference formation is undertheorized, and most people identify as both producers and consumers. A survey experiment of Japanese adults using visual priming fails to support the occupational and coalition theories. Instead, protectionism support motivated by subjects' projected beliefs.

Globalization

Economic interdependence through trade liberalization creates winners and losers. On one hand, an open economic landscape allows corporations and people to move where opportunities for growth are abundant. Cheaper production of goods and access to higher paying jobs, according to classic liberal theory, makes everyone better off. On the other hand, the prospect of outsourcing and demographic change due to immigration may trigger perceptions that an individual's economic security and identity are under threat. The research reviewed in this section investigates the balance of this trade-off. In particular, experimental research allows these scholars to isolate specific causal mechanisms in attitude formation toward outsourcing and immigration. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010 and Lu, et al. 2012 focus on overlapping economic threat explanations for aversion to trade liberalization and immigration. In contrast, Margalit 2012 and Malhotra, et al. 2013 investigate how perceptions of the erosion of cultural identity through economic integration and migration reduce support for liberal policies. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015 contributes to these two perspectives, finding evidence that economic and cultural threat explain attitudes toward globalization. Moreover, Hellwig, et al. 2008 shows that many who feel threatened by globalization also believe that policy makers have the ability to control its effects.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010): 61–84.

A survey experiment of American voters competitively tests two economic explanations for opposition to immigration, labor market competition and financial burden, which uniquely differentiates among immigrant skill. The data support neither economic theory; instead anti-immigration attitudes are associated with lower education levels and concerns about local economic conditions.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2015): 529–548.

A choice-based experiment embedded in a two-wave panel survey conjointly tests reactions to nine immigration applicant attributes, which include identity, culture, and labor skills. Results reinforce labor-market and cultural threat explanations for immigration attitudes, but attribute attitude formation to perceptions of societal, rather than individual, interests.

Hellwig, Timothy T., Eve M. Ringsmuth, and John R. Freeman. "The American Public and the Room to Maneuver: Responsibility Attributions and Policy Efficacy in an Era of Globalization." *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008): 855–880.

A pair of survey experiments conducted in the United States and United Kingdom on the public's attributions of domestic responsibility and influence over macroeconomic forces. Manipulation of question options and contextual primes reveal partisan and education differences in the belief that governments have much control over globalization's effects.

Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. "Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2012): 354–638.

A simple survey experiment provides insight into an important IPE puzzle: protection of low-wage, unskilled industries. American and Chinese respondents more strongly supported protectionism when asked to consider lower wage industries; individual preferences varied depending on the respondents' income relative to the protection-candidate industry, supporting the authors' inequity aversion hypothesis.

Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (2013): 391–410.

A carefully targeted survey of predominantly highly skilled American workers investigates two explanations for individual opposition to immigration: cultural threat and economic self-interest. An embedded implicit association test experiment controls for the prevalence of negative cultural frames and uncovers a conditional impact of labor-market threat within high-skill economic sectors.

Margalit, Yotam. "Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012): 484–500.

Uses a survey experiment of American adults to assess public support for trade openness, testing the effects of anxiety about eroding socio-cultural values. Experimental and cross-national surveys support the hypothesis. Less educated respondents primed to consider cultural values expressed the strongest reservations to trade openness.

Investment

Experimental research on foreign investment primarily focuses on the mechanisms that attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and that make it effective in promoting growth and development. Jensen, et al. 2014 uses a survey experiment of American citizens to test the microfoundations of the common, race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in foreign investment. Mahutga and Bandelj 2008, in contrast, studies foreign investment in central and eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union to examine FDI's effects on economic development. Last, Malesky, et al. 2015 uses survey experiments to sort the multiple causal pathways hypothesized in the relationship between FDI and corruption. All three of these studies effectively capitalize on experimental methods to clarify common theoretical arguments about foreign investment.

Jensen, Nathan M., Edmund Malesky, Mariana Medina, and Ugur Ozdemir. "Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (2014): 433–447.

Introduces political survival as an explanation for inefficient, race-to-the-bottom tendencies among efforts to attract FDI. A survey experiment tests state investment competitiveness (defined as tax incentives) and success and finds that voters support leaders that incentivize FDI through tax breaks, regardless of the success of those efforts.

Mahutga, Matthew C., and Nina Bandelj. "Foreign Investment and Income Inequality: The Natural Experiment of Central and Eastern Europe." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 49 (2008): 429–454.

Capitalizes on a natural experiment resulting from the decolonization of Central and Eastern European countries to explore the effects of FDI on income inequality. The authors find support for the dependency hypothesis that FDI increases inequality; results are reinforced by clearer causal paths and robust to analytic tests.

Malesky, Edmund J., Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, and Nathan M. Jensen. "Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2015): 419–439.

A survey experiment of foreign and domestic firms in Vietnam reveals a conditional relationship between FDI and corruption, where theory and observational data provide less clear guidance. The list experiment finds bribery prevalent, but foreign firms preponderantly pay more bribes in restricted sectors than unrestricted sectors, where rents dissipate.

Development

There exists a rich tradition in development research that uses laboratory, field, survey, and natural experiments. Experiments, as De La O and Wantchekon 2011 explains, address a number of problems that are generally prevalent in observational data collection but which also specifically hinder research in development: simultaneous causality, spurious correlation, and unobserved selection. Experimental research on development is also aided by interest from the policy and non-profit communities who seek assistance with better understanding the

efficacy of their programs (De La O and Wantchekon 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein 2009). For general overviews on recent experimental work in development, the reader is directed to De La O and Wantchekon 2011 and Humphreys and Weinstein 2009. The remaining articles in the section summarize research that uses experiments to study three important development outcomes: violence reduction, social cohesion, and corruption. Fearon, et al. 2009 is concerned with the role that development aid may play in reducing violence after civil war. The authors find that localized strategies improve social cohesion, which they argue is necessary to promote trust. Habyarimana, et al. 2007 verifies this assumption, albeit through a more abstract research design, and demonstrates that trust and reciprocity promote social cohesion. Rather than focusing on the social structures that foster development, Olken 2007 and Olken 2010 study “elite capture,” or corruption, as a corrosive on social and economic development. The pair of studies uses field experiments to determine the efficacy of monitoring mechanisms and democratization for improving public goods provision.

De La O, Ana L. and Leonard Wantchekon. “Experimental Research on Democracy and Development.” In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 384–396. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Explains in detail a series of experimental studies on democracy and development that help address heterogeneity and selection problems pervasive in the field. Particular attention paid to collaboration among researchers, nongovernmental organizations, and government groups lends invaluable insight into the possibilities for bridging the theory/policy divide.

Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. “Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia.” *American Economic Review* 99 (2009): 287–291.

Using a venturesome field research design that randomly assigned communities in Liberia “community driven reconstruction” grants, tests the claim that local, compared to state-focused, strategies foster social cohesion and reduce the risk of recurrent violence after civil war. Evidence supports both the attitudinal and, particularly, the behavioral claims.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” *American Political Science Review* 101 (2007): 709–725.

The authors conduct a unique lab-in-the-field experiment to sort which mechanisms are responsible for lower public goods provisions in ethnically heterogeneous communities. The experiments, in which Ugandan subjects played series of behavioral economics games, identify reciprocity strategy adoption and information flows as prominent mechanisms, with less evidence for ethno-centric preferences.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. “Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 367–378.

Written specifically for economic and social development audiences, this article summarizes a number of field experiments in domestic institutions, collective action, accountability, and political order. The authors specifically point to opportunities for social scientists to conduct field experiments in cooperation with development agencies.

Olken, Benjamin A. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” *Journal of Political Economy* 115 (2007): 200–249.

A deftly executed field experiment tests two corruption reduction methods: top-down auditing and bottom-up, grassroots whistle-blowing. Expert analysis of actual, compared to reported, expenditures contributes to the construction of a village-level measure of corruption. Results demonstrate the efficacy of top-down measures, as grassroots efforts are vulnerable to elite capture.

Olken, Benjamin A. “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010): 243–267.

Investigates the effects of direct democracy on elite capture in development programming. The Indonesian field experiment found democratic participation had no appreciable effect on matching general projects with public preferences over committee selection, but improved non-elite representation in women-specific programs. Encouragingly, democratic selection improved public satisfaction with all development projects.

Foreign Aid

Unlike other areas of IPE research, there are fewer scholars conducting experiments to study foreign aid, but the notable exceptions in this section highlight a number of opportunities. Milner and Tingley 2013 uses a survey experiment to investigate the microfoundations for foreign aid allocation strategies. Their project revealed partisanship to be an important conditioning factor on preferences when respondents were asked to consider multilateral versus bilateral aid. Yet, it remains an open question whether partisanship would also explain support for other foreign aid policies, such as the American strategy to support democracies. Furthermore, for countries that are significant aid contributors, an important question is whether aid has the intended effects of improving recipients' economic stability and improving relations. Werker, et al. 2009 uses the post-oil crisis Saudi Arabian experiment with foreign aid to investigate the economic efficacy of aid, in one example of such research. The authors, though, do not address other factors related to stability or to strategic alignment. While the motivations to give foreign aid are often different from those attached to official development assistance, concerns regarding foreign assistance for regime transitions or to corrupt governments are likely shared between these two areas of research. Thus, research on foreign aid may benefit from the experiment scholarship in the area of development.

Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. "The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy." *Review of International Organization* 8 (2013): 313–341.

Using a survey experiment of American adults, tests the principal–agent argument that domestic foreign aid policy preferences between maintaining control and sharing costs is conditioned by partisanship, which cues preference agreement. Results support the hypothesis, but primarily for Republicans, who are more skeptical of delegating control to international institutions.

Werker, Eric, Faisal Z. Ahmed, and Charles Cohen. "How Is Foreign Aid Spent? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1 (2009): 225–244.

Follows the natural experiment created by a surge of unrestricted aid from oil-rich Arab countries to Muslim countries following the 1973 and 1979 oil crises. Finds little evidence that aid benefited growth but predominantly shifted to import consumption. The unique event presents advantages for causal inference over endogeneity-prone cross-sectional data.

International Organization

Among the major topics of research in IR, international organization (IO) has the shortest record of experimentation. One reason for this dearth is that IO often addresses questions more closely tied to grand, paradigmatic debates, such as the independence of intergovernmental organizations and law. Middle-range IO theories are, as a result, relatively underdeveloped. Relatedly, IO research tends to rely on the unitary actor assumption and has only recently begun to reexamine the internal operations of institutions through observational research. The study of IO must also deal with the more practical concern that individuals, who are often the subjects of experimental research, have only limited agency before international bodies. These tendencies make experimentation a less obvious strategy for empirical research. But, as Chilton and Tingley 2013 avers, international law and, implicitly, IO research would significantly benefit from experimental methods; the authors offer a number of suggestions. In addition, IO could look to other, parallel disciplines, such as bureaucratic and governmental decision-making models, organizational behavior, and economics. Moreover, survey experiments offer the opportunity to test the microfoundations of neo-liberal institutionalist theories, similar to that for the democratic peace. The remainder of this section reviews the extant experimental work in IO, divided into three subsections: IO Design, IO Efficacy, and Norms.

Chilton, Adam S., and Dustin H. Tingley. "Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 52 (2013): 173–237.

A useful guide to experimental research written specifically for international law/organization audiences. Helpfully describes, with well-informed examples, five research problems particular to the field (insufficient variation, isolating overlapping instruments, inadequate dependent variables, selection bias) that experiments may resolve. Includes a comprehensive, though short, bibliography of existing experimental international law research.

IO Design

The publication of the "The Rational Design of International Institutions" by Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (*International Organization* 55.4 [Autumn 2001]: 761–799) represented a watershed in the study of international organization, giving scholars a common framework to study international institutions. Significantly, the rational design project supplied a set of variables, each of which described a particular dimension of an institution's construction. From these variables, membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility, future research could develop testable hypotheses. Each of the papers in this section, to some degree, fall within the rational design tradition by leveraging one or more dimension as an independent or dependent variable. In their project on compliance with environmental agreements, Aakre, et al. 2014 manipulates institutional flexibility through two different enforcement mechanisms. Wallace 2014 similarly studies treaty flexibility in an analysis of attitudes toward international humanitarian law. The study also finds institutional control conditionally shapes veterans' opinions. The other two papers in this section study rational design characteristics as dependent variables. Hafner-Burton, et al. 2014, for example, uses a laboratory experiment to examine variation in institutional membership size and flexibility. Hosli, et al. 2011 incorporates institutional design features as both explanatory (membership) and outcome (centralization) variables in their computational simulations that analyze proposed United Nations Security Council reforms.

Aakre, Stine, Leif Helland, and Jon Hovi. "When Does Informal Enforcement Work?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Forthcoming (2014): 1–29.

Introduces a formal model of multilateral environmental agreement participation to test the enforcement and managerial compliance approaches. Laboratory experiments support both theories finding that compliance is contingent on participation enforcement; subjects contributed more to the public "environmental" good when both instruments were in place.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Brad L. LeVeck, David G. Victor, and James H. Fowler. "Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation." *International Organization* 68 (2014): 845–876.

Hypothesizes that negotiator traits partly drive international institutional design. Incentivized laboratory experiments elicit subjects' patience and strategic reasoning and help estimate preferences over treaty membership size and enforcement. While elites exhibited more patience and strategy than students, both groups preferred complex, multilateral agreements when they possessed each trait.

Hosli, Madeleine O., Rebecca Moody, Bryan O'Donovan, Serguei Kaniovski, and Anna C. H. Little. "Squaring the Circle? Collective Security and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform." *Review of International Organization* 6 (2011): 163–187.

Computational simulations (Penrose-Banzhaf measures) assess five different UN Security Council reform proposals on the council's capacity and legitimacy to act. The simulations demonstrate that more democratic processes, including abolishing the veto, promise to increase the UN Security Council's capacity. More pragmatic reforms, though, should emphasize veto restrictions and non-permanent membership expansion.

Wallace, Geoffrey P. R. "Martial Law? Military Experience, International Law, and Support for Torture." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (2014): 501–514.

An analysis of domestic attitudes to international humanitarian law, particularly distinguishing between veterans and civilians. A survey experiment finds that invoking international law only reduces support among civilians. Veterans, a second survey experiment reveals, withdraw support for torture only when international law is clear and exposes officers to international prosecution.

IO Efficacy

A frequently repeated axiom in IO research is Louis Henkin's observation, "Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time" (p. 47). Substantial debate and skepticism persists over the validity of Henkin's statement. Moreover, observational research on the independence and efficacy of international institutions has failed to fully satisfy challenges to causal inference related to overlapping treaty instruments and strategic selection. The papers summarized in this section make effective use of experiments to respond to two questions about IO efficacy: How pervasive is compliance with international law? When do leaders follow through with international obligations? Findley, et al. 2013 responds to the first question using a highly innovative field experiment. Chaudoin 2014 and Grieco, et al. 2011 both use domestic audience costs theories to address the second question. The two articles differ, though, in the hypothesized role that institutions play in shaping public attitudes. Chaudoin 2014 presents international treaty obligations as an alternative policy position to those of democratic leaders while Grieco, et al. 2011 posits that institutions may act as separate elite cues. McEntire, et al. 2015 further probes necessary micro-foundations of international organizations' ability to induce compliance: mass mobilization against human rights abuses.

Chaudoin, Stephen. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions." *International Organization* 68 (2014): 235–256.

Chaudoin explores the microfoundations of the neo-liberal institutionalist theory that leaders comply with treaties to avoid reprisals from domestic audiences, who favor consistency. Results from an online survey experiment show that treaty compliance only matters for individuals without strong policy preferences, lessening the independent draw of institutions on compliance.

Findley, Michael G., Daniel L. Nielson, and J. C. Sharman. "Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation." *International Organization* 57 (2013): 657–693.

Large, cross-national (182 countries, $n = 1,264$) field experiment on firms' compliance with international laws regulating the creation of shell corporations. Tests of four compliance theories (managerial, hegemonic stability, rationalism, and constructivism) find noncompliance in this area to be commonplace and counterintuitively affected by leading IR theories.

Grieco, Joseph, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reiffler, and Peter D. Feaver. "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 563–583.

The authors employ a survey experiment to test an argument commonly made in IO scholarship: the public looks to IOs as independent cues on foreign policy appropriateness. Results generally support the argument, but further inspection reveals that the effects of IO endorsements are conditional on individual internationalism and presidential support.

McEntire, Kyla Jo, Michele Leiby, and Matthew Krain. "Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization." *American Political Science Review* 109 (2015): 407–426.

A clearly designed survey experiment tests the efficacy of three mobilization frames commonly used among nongovernmental organizations: informational, personal, and motivational. While all three frames improved awareness of the human rights abuse at issue, personal frames had the largest effect. Furthermore, only personal frames mobilized participants to take action.

Norms

In their framework for norm formation, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52.4 [Autumn 1998]: 887–917) describe a three-stage model beginning with the emergence of a norm that eventually “cascades” through the international system by adoption and imitation. Finally, a norm becomes an internalized rule that structures behavior in the international system. Given the dynamic and nonlinear path that norms follow until their internalization, where causal inference is difficult to detect with observational data, the use of experiments to study norms offers tremendous promise. Early research in this field primarily offers assessments of the “compliance pull” exerted by specific norms: human rights (Chilton 2014–2015), nonintervention (Herrmann and Shannon 2001), and just war theory (Hoffman, et al. 2015). Each of these three papers tests norm internalization through micro-foundations: norms that have become widely accepted and internalized internationally should shape domestic attitudes as the public eventually conforms to national interests and elite cues.

Chilton, Adam S. “The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study.” *Chicago Journal of International Law* 15 (2014–2015): 110–137.

Conducts a direct test of international law’s efficacy, comparing domestic values for rule conformity with morality and *pacta sunt servanda* norms. An online survey experiment found appeals to treaty obligations more persuasive than appeals to generic human rights norms; mediation analysis confirms support generated by subjects’ value for conformity.

Herrmann, Richard K., and Vaughn P. Shannon. “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making.” *International Organization* 55 (2001): 621–654.

Recruits a unique sample of US elites to analyze the pull exerted by nonintervention and nonviolence norms. Four survey experiments manipulate intervention targets’ motives, capabilities, conflict location, and political culture. Results find elites’ choices consistent with normative obligations, but open-ended justifications and further analysis evince stronger support for material interests.

Hoffman, Aaron M., Christopher R. Agnew, Laura E. VanderDrift, and Robert Kulzick. “Norms, Diplomatic Alternatives, and the Social Psychology of War Support.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (2015): 3–28.

Three laboratory experiments investigate the draw of *jus ad bellum* norms in American support for the use of force. The authors claim extant research overestimates American militarism because surveys omit viable diplomatic alternatives. Experimental results support their argument; multifactorial analysis suggests an underlying belief in force as a last resort.

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