

Trading Effectiveness for Acceptability: The (Dis)Use of Formal International Organizations in
Interstate Conflict Management

- *Under Review* -

Vanessa A. Lefler
University of Iowa

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Abstract

Recent research demonstrates the efficacy of international organizations in managing interstate disputes, but has devoted less rigorous attention to the selection process surrounding their use. I present a theory for the pursuit of dispute settlement through institutional fora that focuses on three important IGO functions: reducing transaction costs, transmitting information, and increasing transparency. However, alternative settlement fora, such as bilateral negotiations and state intermediaries, can serve similar roles, allowing states to pursue management through other, more preferred – though less effective – cooperative arrangements. Empirical analyses demonstrate states' selective application to international organizations for conflict management. Notably, disputants for which re-contracting costs, information sharing, and public commitment are less problematic, such as democracies, are less likely to employ institutionalized fora because they do not need institutions to fulfill those functions in settlement negotiations.

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International organizations (IGOs) are important agenda-setting tools in the international system – providing focal points for channeling as well as attenuating the exercise of power. They “lock-in” the systemic balance of power and provide long-term solutions to questions about efficiency and distributional uncertainties in international relations (Ikenberry 2001; Keohane 1984; Schelling 1960). More recently, scholars note that IGOs, such as the UN Security Council, additionally legitimize and lower the costs of foreign policy decisions (Chapman 2007; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Voeten 2005), transmit information to domestic and international audiences (Allee and Huth 2006a; Fearon 1994; Grigorescu 2007; Thompson 2006), and facilitate peaceful interactions between states in the international system (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Russett and Oneal 2001). Corresponding with these observations on the value of IGOs in moderating aggressive behavior, there has been tremendous growth in the supply and diversity of formal organizations designed to manage interstate conflicts. Since the 1950s, the number of multilateral organizations and treaties with explicit provisions calling on member-states to pursue peaceful solutions to interstate disputes has sky-rocketed, which has been demonstrated to have both positive direct and indirect effects on states' responses to contentious, interstate conflicts (Crescenzi et al. 2011; Mitchell and Hensel 2007).

Significant to this last observation, formal international organizations are more likely to help states form settlements that resolve underlying sources of conflict and agreements reached through IGOs are more likely to command compliance (Gent and Shannon 2010; Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008; Hensel 2001; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Together, these findings

suggest that one key to resolving future conflicts is to encourage states to negotiate through institutional fora. But, as others have noted, countries in conflict typically do not submit their disputes to settlement through international organizations and, instead, attempt to negotiate bilaterally or through *ad hoc* fora, such as multilateral arbitration panels or state intermediaries (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Shannon 2009). A resulting concern is that effective peaceful settlements are not produced in frequencies comparable to the supply of reliable, institutional settlement fora because states find alternatives to these approaches that do not require them to delegate authority to a third-party actor or to submit disputes to fora where the potential for public scrutiny could have implications for other domestic or international conflicts.

What prevents the realization of widespread use of institutional solutions to interstate conflict is that conflict management is a voluntary process and states will only agree to fora that they both find acceptable (Bercovitch 2007). Though interstate conflict management scholars have devoted substantial energy to explain both the supply of third-party settlement fora and when they are successful, less rigorous attention has been paid to the *selection* of various strategies, including the selection of institutional approaches. Noteworthy exceptions concentrate on the use of specific types of management fora, such as (quasi)legal institutions or the implementation of different procedural approaches (e.g., mediation) to managing conflicts where scholars find that disputant characteristics, such as democratic regimes, and the nature of the conflict predict the types of strategies that are employed (Allee and Huth 2006; Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Dixon 1993; Fang 2010; Greig 2005; Shannon 2009; Simmons 2002). However,

few of these efforts encompass a comprehensive view of the alternatives available to states. Instead, most distinguish simply between bilateral negotiations and particular types of third-party fora.¹

To explain the use of IGOs in conflict management, I expand the set of peaceful settlement alternatives to include non-institutional third-party fora, such as state-led mediation, with institutional and bilateral options. In so doing, I characterize the selection process within the rationalist conflict bargaining framework where settlement fora vary according to the central functions that IGOs play in conflict management – transaction costs, information transmission, and commitment enforcement. I then examine how other types of conflict management fora may fulfill similar roles for states that have the ability to re-contract around institutions. An important insight of this approach is that states can take advantage of domestic and inter-national institutions and linkages to copy some of the functions of IGOs in bilateral negotiations or with the assistance of other third-parties. In essence, states design other acceptable fora from the elements that make institutions effective.

Using data on territorial, maritime, and river claims in the Americas, Western Europe and the Middle East between 1816 and 2001 from the Issue Correlates of War project, I examine the selection of IGOs for management compared to the selection of state intermediaries and bilateral negotiations. Empirical analyses support the prediction that forum selection is a non-linear

¹ There are exceptions to this rule, of course. Hensel (2001) describes the use of various settlement strategies, including institutional and legal approaches, and Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth (2008) explore the effect of both binding and non-binding techniques, as compared with bilateral negotiations, on the success of conflict management efforts. Wiegand and Powell (2010) later observe that choices to pursue any of three different settlement strategies – bilateral negotiations, non-binding mediation, or binding arbitration or adjudication – are affected by disputants' expectations about winning their claim. Gent and Shannon (2011) additionally explore multiple dimensions of conflict management strategies, by examining the selection of biased intermediaries when states grant decision control to a third-party.

function of disputants' ability to make trade-offs between forum acceptability and effectiveness. Jointly-democratic disputants, for instance, are more likely to select bilateral negotiations over either third-party alternative (state-led, IGO-led), suggesting that democracies are more capable of transmitting information, creating audience costs and coordinating on procedural rules than other types of states. But when democracies do select third-party fora, they are more likely to submit to IGOs than to other states, indicating that democracies place less trust in other states for dispute settlement. Issue salience has the inverse effect on forum selection; disputants in low and high salience conflicts are more likely to accept invitations from other states to manage their conflicts than they are to pursue bilateral negotiations or dispute settlement through IGOs. In sum, this project provides more evidence to the growing research on forum selection, or forum shopping, in interstate conflict management, demonstrating that states are selective in their use of management strategies.

The IGO Market in Conflict Management

As several other scholars note,² states have a number of options in the pursuit of peaceful dispute resolution. Other states, transnational organizations, and IGOs may help states resolve their disputes through any of several means, including good offices, consultation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. Reliable access to management fora, additionally, has grown over the last 50 years: the number of treaties and multilateral organizations that explicitly call for the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes has increased and some states, like Norway and the United States, are building reputations as diplomatic peace-makers (Bercovitch 1997;

² See Abbott and Snidal 2006; Alter and Meunier 2009; Busch 2007; Cogan 2008; Hensel 2001; Jupille and Snidal 2006; and S. M. Mitchell 2002 for discussions on the variety of settlement alternatives and their implications for the management of international conflict.

Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Greig 2005). Such growth, as illustrated by the number of peaceful settlement treaties in existence between 1816 and 2005 in Figure 1, creates a “market” of peaceful settlement fora from which states can select. Not only can states “forum shop” across dispute settlement alternatives, the options they have are each likely to improve conflict bargaining processes. Crescenzi, Kadera, Mitchell and Thyne (2011) observe that as the supply of third-party intermediaries increases, the quality of these fora also increases as mediators are more likely to be democratic and impartial. Third parties, further, are more capable of delivering credible information and offering management assistance because competition with other third-party venues rewards honesty and third-party effort in mediation. Though some disputes, undoubtedly, receive less attention from potential third-party intermediaries than others (Beardsley 2010; Fortna 2004), most disputants are able to select from several outside management alternatives to bilateral negotiations especially if they are both members to peaceful dispute resolution treaties. For disputants engaged in issue-based claims between 1816 and 2001, joint membership in at least one peaceful settlement treaty accounts for more than 75 percent of the observations.³ Nonetheless, IGOs were used as third-party intermediaries in just 10 percent of the cases under analysis.⁴

3 Using the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlements data (Hensel 2005). All of the claims where the disputants did not share at least one dispute resolution treaty in common were between 1816 and 1972. After 1972, all pairs of disputants were members to at least one peaceful settlement treaty.

4 The majority of these cases are in maritime claims, where approximately a quarter of all disputes in the ICOW maritime claims data were submitted to management by an international organization. River claims were similarly more likely than average to be managed by IGOs, with just more than 15 percent using institutionalized fora. In contrast, only four percent of territorial disputes used IGOs to help facilitate settlement agreements. These observations are indicative both of the difficulties inherent to territorial conflicts (Gibler 2007; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Simmons 2002; Vásquez 1993) and of the stronger norms supporting institutionalized solutions to river and maritime claims (Hensel, S.M. Mitchell, and Sowers 2006; Hensel et al. 2008; B. Mitchell 1976; Ostrom 1990). Some of the oldest as well as most formalized international organizations were designed to specifically manage these types of claims.

[Figure 1 about here]

What especially makes international organizations desirable – or potentially replaceable – as conflict managers are the features that characterize their role in international cooperation. International organizations attempt to protect members against *uncertainties about the future* by incentivizing long-term cooperation and “locking in” power balances. Institutional agreements further make the conduct of international business more efficient by *reducing transaction costs* of renegotiating new terms or maintaining multiple bilateral agreements and by *transmitting information* between member states (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Ikenberry 2001; Keohane 1984). These functions are not only important for the effective administration of cooperation, but also for the successful management of interstate conflicts. Long-term solutions to commitment problems, information channels, and more efficient alternatives to outside options address the challenges states face in conflict bargaining (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; see also Fearon 1995). Variations undoubtedly exist across institutional capacities to fulfill each of these roles, but together they form a baseline upon which to evaluate the use and effectiveness of IGOs in conflict management. The next three sections outline how each of these functions improves IGOs' ability to effectively manage disputes and describes that factors that would lead disputants to accept those conditions of management.

Transaction Costs and Shopping Opportunities

Transaction costs describe the costs incurred when actors must negotiate new contracts, or agreements (Keohane 1984). International organizations reduce transaction costs, in part, by centralizing states' interactions through a “concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus” (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 9). In interstate conflict management, IGOs

provide a more efficient alternative to bilateral negotiations or *ad hoc* multilateral arrangements because disputants do not need to engage in additional bargaining over procedural rules and forum composition, which can further delay settlements, increase the risk that violence reignites, and make the management of future conflicts more challenging (Malintoppi 2006). The UN Charter, for example, explicitly outlines the proper course of action in the event of an international crisis: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to engender the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by ... peaceful means of their own choice” (Charter of the United Nations, Article 33[1]).⁵

Expectations for the resolution of interstate disputes are even more explicit among some international courts, whose jurisdiction and procedures are more detailed (Alter 2008). Express instructions for conflict management create a standard for interaction and improves disputants’ disposition toward third-party management (LaTour et al. 1976). Disputants are more likely to return to management fora they have used in the past and were successful in obtaining favorable distributional outcomes (Wiegand and Powell 2010), again demonstrating that familiarity with negotiation procedures reduces disputants' incentives to try other approaches and increases the likelihood that disputants will use institutional fora.

Not all IGOs will be similarly capable of reducing the transaction costs of settlement negotiations by providing access to consistent procedures for conflict management. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004), using a 3-point scale to measure an organization's institutional

5 Article 33(1) of the UN Charter elaborates on the number of acceptable methods by which disputants may attempt to reach a peaceful settlement: “The parties to any dispute ... shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

capacity, observe that some IGOs have significantly greater latitude over policy than others.⁶ Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth (2008) use this scale to classify peaceful settlement organizations (see Appendix) and to test the effects of IGO institutionalization on settlement outcomes. Both authors show that interventionist organizations are more likely to help states reach agreements and ensure compliance. Other institutions, such as regional IGOs, may face additional difficulties as they struggle remain independent from their member states (Haftel and Thompson 2006). Yet, IGOs have a comparative advantage in reducing transaction costs in conflict management relative to other forum choices. Though some state intermediaries are repeatedly called upon to manage interstate conflicts – the United States and the United Kingdom were third-party intermediaries in more than 20 percent and 16 percent, respectively, of all territorial, maritime and river disputes in the Americas, Western Europe and the Middle East between 1816 and 2001 – they do not have the institutional or political continuity that international organizations can offer. Likewise, bilateral negotiations require disputants to establish negotiation procedures themselves, which may be challenging if states face other bargaining problems (Pillar 1983).

The purpose of using IGOs in conflict management is to reduce transaction costs associated with prolonged settlement negotiations. Typically, as discussed above, disputants face bargaining problems and/or infrastructural barriers⁷ that make IGO management especially

6 Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom categorize IGOs according to the following definitions:

1. Minimal organizations: hold occasional meetings, but do not have regular or extensive secretarial or bureaucratic staff that engage in more than basic planning and information-gathering.
2. Structured organizations: are able to implement policy and execute formal procedures and rules because they contain assembly, executive, and bureaucratic arms that regularly meet and are staffed.
3. Interventionist organizations: have the capacity to implement policy, as structured organizations are, but also have the ability to use mediation, arbitration/adjudication, and/or collective action to manage disputes, enforce rules and norms, and influence members' foreign policy decisions.

7 For example, states that do not have high rates and levels of education are less likely to have access to conflict management experts that could be employed in place of institutional solutions (Zartman 2007).

desirable. However, if disputants can access extra-institutional issue linkages, they may be able to negotiate bilateral agreements with similar efficiency to IGO management. The more similar two states are in terms of their foreign policy dispositions and diplomatic approaches, the more tools they have to pursue alternatives to formal IGOs. For example, democracies are more likely to approach diplomatic relations with similar respect for the rule of law, reciprocity, and peaceful settlement (Dixon 1993; Mintz and Nehemia 1993; S. M. Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2009). Democracies may be able to draw upon these commonalities to reduce the transaction costs of crafting new bilateral agreements and avoid third-party management. Similarly, disputants that are members of multiple, linked alliances have similarly greater freedom to employ alternative methods of dispute resolution because shared alliance ties encourage the use of cooperative solutions to conflicts, such as bilateral negotiations or mediation by other alliance members, in order to protect the security of the treaty (Lai and Reiter 2000). For example, in the 1972 Second Cod War between Iceland and Great Britain over fishing rights in northern Atlantic, NATO members intervened to prevent a weakening of the alliance (B. Mitchell 1976).

Together, these observations suggest two hypotheses about the disuse of IGOs in conflict management:

Hypothesis 1: Jointly democratic disputants will be more likely to use bilateral negotiations to resolve contentious claims.

Hypothesis 2: Disputants that share more alliance linkages are less likely to use institutional fora to resolve contentious claims.

The similarities between democracies make it more likely that they will use bilateral negotiations instead of institutionalized fora or management by other states because they can replicate some of the procedural advantages of IGO management through domestic institutions. Alternatively, states that share similar alliance portfolios have access to multiple alternatives to IGO management because they may either negotiate bilaterally or rely on alliance members to facilitate settlement agreements.

Information Transmission, Agreement, and Acceptability

A second important function of IGOs in conflict management is their ability to transmit information to member-states. International organizations typically have better access to information about the disputants by virtue of their institutional memory, independence, and expertise (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). These features confer additional benefits on IGOs as information “arbitrageurs” because independent international organizations are more likely to be neutral and unbiased in managing disputes (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). Shannon (2009) suggests that IGO neutrality improves disputants' trust in the proceedings and should lead to the selection of institutional solution in conflict management because neither party will anticipate significant concessions from a facilitated settlement. Concerns about impartiality will be especially salient when disputants agree to arbitration or adjudications, where the third party delivers a binding decision. Because states are motivated by distributional outcomes, related to their concerns about bargaining efficiency, disputants will not negotiate through fora where the outcome is expected to be biased (Gent and Shannon 2011).

Disputes characterized by information problems are more likely to pursue IGO-facilitated management strategies because international organizations are most likely to resolve information

asymmetries. As Fearon (1995) explains, information problems arise from disputants' incentives to misrepresent information about capabilities and resolve.⁸ When the balance of capabilities between disputants is relatively even, states cannot use the threat of force to coerce an adversary to concede. Therefore, they have access to fewer outside options such as war or bilateral negotiations to resolve interstate conflicts and are more likely to use institutional solutions (Chapman and Wolford 2010; Fearon 1998; Voeten 2001). Alternatively, when one disputant is significantly more powerful than another, the stronger actor is able to use the threat of force to coerce its adversary to concede and, thus, unbalanced disputants will be more likely to use bilateral negotiations to settle interstate conflicts. Hypotheses 3 captures this logic:

Hypothesis 3: Disputes in which the balance of capabilities favors one actor over another are less likely to employ third-party conflict management strategies and are more likely to use bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes.

A second source of information problems that lead to war is a disputant's incentive to misrepresent information about its resolve to use military force over the issue. Another way to think about resolve is to conceptualize it in terms of a state's value for war; as a disputant's value for war increases a dispute is more likely to become militarized (Fearon 1995). In the context of contentious interstate disputes, the salience of the issue to the disputants may serve as an approximation of a state's willingness to resort to extreme methods of conflict management.

⁸ Fearon (1995, 1998) emphasizes that asymmetric information about resolve is more likely to lead to war than uncertainties about the relative balance of power because states are likely to have fairly accurate information about the capabilities of their adversaries. But, Blainey (1988) argues that disagreements about the distribution of power are the central source of conflict between states, which Slantchev and Tarar (2011) demonstrate in a theoretical model that predicts the incidence of war when both disputants are optimistic about their chances of winning a military conflict. I include both of these potential sources of information problems in order to demonstrate how disputants select settlement strategies around each potential settlement barrier.

Hensel (2001, 85) explains, “If salience is meaningful, leaders may be willing to expend greater effort (and to risk higher costs) to achieve favorable settlements on highly salient issues than on issues that accorded less importance.”

Issue salience, essentially, alters the range of acceptable agreements and strategies in conflict management. For example, imagine that two disputants are negotiating over the division of a single-dimension issue. Each would ideally possess the entire space and their utilities for compromise, without bargaining or conflict costs, are single-peaked and symmetric, as illustrated in Figure 2. As the salience of the issue to the disputant increases, the area covered within each actor's indifference curve decreases, along with the disputants' range of compromise agreements as demonstrated by the shift from the solid lines to the dashed lines that represent the parties' preferences over agreements within the issue space.

[Figure 2 about here]

Because disputants conceal their level of resolve, third parties are needed to facilitate negotiations and broker agreements. Therefore, disputants in highly salient conflicts are more likely to resort to IGO-managed settlement fora, than disputants in low salience conflicts that have more opportunities to bilaterally negotiate within the larger range of compromise arrangements. However, the relationship between resolve, or salience, and forum selection may not be linear. High salience conflicts are characterized by a number of fundamental disagreements that could make pre-negotiation selection of settlement strategies infeasible as other bargaining problems prevent agreement on even basic issues (Hensel 2001). This was a problem, for instance, in past negotiations between Guatemala and Belize over the territorial

autonomy of Belize. Guatemalan leaders have been sanctioned by domestic populations for even recognizing the legal existence of Belize (Wiegand 2005), which has made it difficult for the states to agree to third-party management. Therefore, high salience conflicts are likely to employ both bilateral and institutionalized tactics to resolve their conflicts, reflecting the difficulties in resolving information asymmetries over resolve.

Hypothesis 4: High salience conflicts are likely to result in both bilateral and IGO-managed conflict management.

The Commitment Problem and Transparency

Finally, international organizations resolve commitment problems that arise from uncertainty about an adversary's willingness to comply with settlement decisions. Essentially, states can take advantage of the transparency of IGOs to ensure that settlement agreements are enforced. Russett and Oneal (2001) suggest that international organizations can use collective action, such as military force or sanctions, to directly coerce states to comply with institutional rules and norms. The ability of an IGO to fulfill these functions depends on its institutional capacity and transparency. Returning to the notion of institutional capacity discussed in the context of transaction costs, Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) also find that highly institutionalized international organizations provide better monitoring and enforcement of agreements than less formalized institutions. This effect is particularly strong when an IGO is given the authority to deliver a binding decision (Gent and Shannon 2010, 2011; Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008; Hensel 2001). Binding settlements from international organizations have the dual benefit of providing political cover against sanctions from domestic audiences

(Allee and Huth 2006b) and for evoking norms from the international community that, *pacta sunt servanda*, agreements must be kept (Simmons 2002).

IGOs, as fora for international discourse, additionally open settlement negotiations and outcomes to scrutiny from actors outside the dispute, and a forum's transparency can compensate for less rigorous enforcement mechanisms. Through transparent institutions, domestic and international audiences learn about the outcomes of settlement negotiations because these institutions have attentive, invested members and make their decisions publicly available (Davis 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Prat 2005; Smith 1985; Strasavage 2004).⁹ Institutional legitimacy is additionally improved when an IGO is transparent because member-states and external, transnational actors can provide better monitoring (Grigorescu 2007). In sum, forum transparency ensures states' commitment to settlement agreements by increasing domestic and international audience costs, making violations more easily detected and raising sanctions for non-compliance (Busch 2007; Fang 2010). Accordingly, disputes characterized by potential commitment problems are more likely to seek conflict management through IGOs.

Interestingly, though they are more likely to employ dispute resolution strategies and encourage norms of reciprocity and peaceful settlement, democracies face substantial commitment problems as domestic audiences can punish leaders for unfavorable concessions and fail to execute settlement agreements (Allee and Huth 2006a; Simmons 2002). Putnam (1988)

9 At least those institutions with the capacity to report their own activities. Not all international organizations have the ability to provide public records of IGO activities, either because they do not have resources available to devote to the task or because they do not have the mandate to carry out such functions. In either case, other states and domestic actors will be less able to interpret the results of management outcomes, moderating the assertion that international organizations are transparent fora. As Grigorescu (2007) explains, variations in institutional transparency affect international relations, making some institutions more credible than others at attenuating the power of strong states and legitimizing foreign policy decisions.

describes this problem as a two-level game where one set of actors, the government, forms agreements that must later be enforced by another set of actors. Democracies are especially sensitive to this principle-agent problem because domestic audiences can remove leaders from office if their decisions do not align with the national interest as perceived by the public (Fearon 1994). Therefore, democracies are more likely to use institutionalized fora in conflict management than non-democracies because IGOs provide political cover for democratic leaders.

Hypothesis 5: Democracies are more likely to use IGOs as third-party conflict managers. Together, the hypotheses 1 and 5 suggest that democracies, much like high salience disputes, select management fora according to concerns for efficiency and acceptability. When democracies submit to third-party conflict management, they should be more likely to use institutionalized fora. Otherwise, they should use bilateral negotiations to take advantage of other bargaining efficiencies.

Preferences for transparent fora to resolve commitment problems may be moderated, however, when disputants are engaged in multiple conflicts. IGO transparency affects states compliance with settlement agreements by making it reputationally disadvantageous to renege. “If a state cheats its [IGO] partner on one agreement, this could have ripple effects on its relations with that state in other organizations” or with other states in that organization (Mitchell and Hensel 2007, 726). The converse is that negotiations through transparent, international fora establish a precedent for future interactions and information about concessions, capabilities, or resolve revealed in settlement negotiations can be “leaked” to third parties looking in the on the process (Busch 2007; Prat 2005). Therefore, states that are involved in multiple conflicts will

prefer to avoid management strategies that make them vulnerable to other challengers and, instead, use state-led management or bilateral negotiations to resolve conflicts.

Hypothesis 6: Disputes in which at least one of the parties is engaged in other, on-going conflicts are less likely to use IGOs in conflict management.

After-Market Controls

The above discussion outlined three dispute characteristics that affect the selection of international organizations in conflict management: access to outside options, information asymmetry, and sensitivity to external audiences. From these characteristics, I predict that joint democracy, shared alliance commitments, disputants' balance of capabilities, issue salience, and external conflicts affect states' decisions to use bilateral, state-led, or IGO-led management fora. Other factors that influence these decisions include other aspects of the disputants' relationship, such as joint membership in international organizations, and the history of the dispute. The control variables are summarized in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Data

To investigate the use of IGOs in conflict management, I use the Issue Correlates of War project data on territorial, maritime, and river claims in the Americas, Western Europe and the Middle East between 1816 and 2001 (Hensel 2001; Hensel, S. M. Mitchell, and Sowers 2006; Hensel, S. M. Mitchell, Sowers, et al. 2008).¹⁰ The data gather observations of each attempt to settle a contentious claim, through peaceful or militarized means. The dependent variable, the

¹⁰ Territorial claims data include all claims in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe between 1816 and 2001. River claims are coded for the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East between 1900 and 2001. Maritime claims are collected for the Western Hemisphere and Europe between 1900 and 2001.

settlement forum, is divided into three categories: bilateral negotiations, state-led management, and IGO management. This categorization allows for a more comprehensive examination of forum selection in conflict management. Comparing bilateral negotiations with the use of state intermediaries or with submission to IGOs neglects the choice of the omitted category and disguises potential non-linear relationships between the explanatory variables and the observation of peaceful settlement fora. The ICOW data code the management approach used and the identity of the third party, if any. From these observations, I separate third-party fora according to the following rules. Bilateral negotiations are counted direct attempts between the disputants to resolve the conflict without the assistance of any outside party.

Management efforts by regional and global international organizations are both counted as IGO-facilitated dispute settlement. Though the effect of international organizations on conflict management varies substantially according to the size of their membership and their institutional capacity (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Haftel and Thompson 2006), international organizations share general characteristics. Some of these characteristics, such as the ability to centralize states' interactions and reduce transaction costs are unique to international organizations as third party fora, whether they are regional or global. Collapsing these into one category captures these aspects of the forum.

A third-party management forum is coded as state-led if any single state or informal coalition of states leads the management effort.¹¹ State-led efforts, then, include attempts by

¹¹ Additional analyses (not reported) separate multilateral and unilateral attempts by state intermediaries to manage disputes. Empirical results for the two analyses were not significantly different, with the exception of the variable controlling for management approach. Multilateral coalitions were more likely to be selected when disputants agreed to binding conflict management. This is due to the fact that arbitral tribunals are made up of panels of representatives from several states (Bilder 2007; Malintoppi 2006).

major powers and minor powers to facilitate peaceful settlement. Much like international organizations, states have differing capacities in their roles as third-party managers: Major powers are able to use the threat of sanctions and military force to ensure commitments and access to military intelligence to obtain independent information about disputants' capabilities and resolve (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Greig 2005). Minor powers, on the other hand, rely more on their reputations as neutral, honest brokers of peace that can ensure the privacy of settlement negotiations (Slim 1992). The theory would make different predictions about disputants' appeal to these different types of intermediaries, but in comparison to IGOs as conflict managers, state intermediaries also share more in common with one another than with other types of settlement fora. States do not as efficiently reduce transaction costs, and they less frequently solve commitment problems through transparent mechanisms.

The data count 986 attempts to peacefully settle the contentious claims. Of these, bilateral negotiations make up the major share of efforts: 654 (66 percent) of all peaceful settlement attempts were direct talks between disputes. State-led efforts account for 22 percent (219) of all peaceful settlement efforts and international organizations were used in 113 (12 percent) of the cases. When third parties are used to manage interstate conflicts, states frequently call upon the same actors to help facilitate settlements. Table 2 lists the ten most frequently used third party actors in the management of territorial, maritime, and river disputes. Notably, two states, the United States and the United Kingdom, are the most frequently employed third-party intermediaries. Despite its limited presence in the time frame under study, the International Court of Justice is also involved in adjudicating a substantial number of conflicts.¹²

¹² The International Court of Justice was established in 1945 by the UN Charter.

[Table 2 about here]

The theory predicts that democracies, shared alliance portfolios, relative capabilities, issue salience, and external conflicts affect disputants' agreement of management fora. I measure the first variable, joint democracy, using the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), coding a claimant as a democracy if it has a score of 6 or higher on the Polity democracy scale. If both disputants in a claim are democracies, then the joint democracy variable is coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0. The second variable, shared alliance portfolios, draws disputants' weighted, global S-scores that compares the number of shared alliances between the disputants (Signorino and Ritter 1999). The S-scores capture both the number of external issue linkages disputants share outside the conflict and the importance of those linkages. Higher S-scores demonstrate stronger issue linkages between disputants, approximating the ease with which disputants can contract around international organizations in conflict management. The balance of states' capabilities are calculated as a function of both disputants' scores on the Composite Index of National Capabilities from the Correlates of War project (Singer 1987; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The variable, relative power, is a ratio of the challenger's capabilities to the combined power of both disputants ranging between 0.5 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating the challenger's dominance over the target state and values closer to 0.5 indicating parity.¹³

Issue salience is taken from the ICOW project. Issue salience is coded on a scale from 1 to 12, with 12 indicating claims that are significant strategic and intangible value to both disputants. I use the categorical coding of this variable that separates claims into low, moderate, and high levels of salience. Low-salience claims, which account for approximately of 14 percent

¹³ Polity IV measures, S-scores, and CINC scores were compiled using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

of all claims, are those that receive a score between 1 and 4 on the salience scale. Disputants in low salience claims are predicted to pursue bilateral forms of conflict management because they are less likely to have disagreements about resolve and have a wider range of acceptable compromises. High salience claims are predicted to be more difficult to manage, and make up more than 45 percent of the cases in the data.

The last explanatory variable indicates whether any party to a dispute was involved in a different conflict with another state in the same year. States that have multiple on-going conflicts are more protective of their reputations because concessions in one dispute could have spill-over effects onto others. Because third-party management is a voluntary process where both parties must agree on a forum, if either claimant has an outstanding conflict with another state, the entire management process is affected. Therefore, this variable measuring outside conflicts codes a dispute 1 if either party involved in another on-going conflict and 0 if the claim under observation is the only dispute for both parties.

Control variables, described in Table 1, account for additional aspects of the dispute and the disputants' relationship that influence the peaceful settlement process. Data for each of these variables is obtained from the ICOW project. The first of these variables, management approach, is a dummy variable indicating whether the disputants pursued binding management approaches, such as arbitration or adjudication, with this settlement attempt. Binding conflict management is demonstrated elsewhere to be especially effective at resolving interstate conflicts and states are more likely to select impartial and institutional fora when they engage in arbitration or adjudication. Therefore, this variable should be positively associated with the selection of IGOs

as third-party conflict managers. The next set of variables takes into account disputants' past efforts to resolve the active claim. Previous forum indicates what type of forum, bilateral, state-led, IGO-led, the disputants used in the preceding attempt to resolve the conflict. Previous experience with a forum informs disputants' expectations about distributional outcomes and familiarizes them with negotiation procedures. Therefore, disputants should be more likely to return to the same type of forum they used in previous efforts. This variable is coded as a set of dummy variables indicating the use of each strategy; bilateral negotiations are the omitted category in multivariate analysis. The next three variables described in Table 1 are counts of the number of different settlement efforts, the more peaceful attempts states make, both in the immediate and distant past, the more likely they are to escalate to more institutionalized forms of management. Alternatively, violent conflicts can become entrenched, and therefore disputes that have a long history of militarized conflict are more likely to be managed bilaterally. Finally, disputes are characterized by the type of issue at stake. Territorial disputes are more difficult to resolve due to issue indivisibilities, and thus territorial disputes, compared to river or maritime claims are less likely to be managed through third-party fora. In multivariate analysis, river disputes, which make up approximately 13 percent of all claims, are the omitted category.

Finally, the empirical analysis accounts for the number of memberships in international organizations with explicit peaceful settlement provisions that disputants share. The ICOW data counts joint membership in multilateral treaties of pacific settlement, defined by the MTOPS data (Hensel 2005). Apart from directly facilitating agreements, IGOs that obligate members to resolve conflicts peacefully have a pacifying effect. Disputants with more shared membership

have more options from which to select in deciding on a forum and are more likely to employ use IGOs in conflict management (Shannon 2009).

Research Design

To evaluate the selection of institutional fora in conflict management, I use multinomial logistic regression, clustering observations on dyadic claims to account for similarities across multiple attempts to settle the same dispute.¹⁴ Table 3 reports the results from the analysis. In general, the theory receives only modest support, but the hypotheses that are confirmed reveal interesting implications for forum selection and the role of IGOs in managing interstate conflict. Models 2 and 3 show that joint democracy significantly predicts the type of forum disputants selected, providing support for hypotheses 1 and 5: Democracies are more likely to use bilateral negotiations over third-party fora, indicating democracies' ability to contract around IGOs and other intermediaries. When democracies do use third-party fora, they are more likely to submit to international organizations. The substantive effect of joint democracy on forum selection is not large, as shown in Figure 3, but models confirm the presence of a significant, non-linear relationship between regime type and the selection of settlement fora. Democracies either elect to negotiate bilaterally or settle through IGOs, and there is a lacuna around the use of other states as intermediaries. Figure 4 shows the frequency with which jointly democratic disputants submitted to each type of settlement forum. Though the basin around the selection of states as third-party intermediaries is not deep, there is a noticeable difference in the frequency with which democracies invite other states to manage their conflicts.

¹⁴ Analysis passes Hausman test of the IIA assumption and results from multinomial probit and ordered probit do not result in substantively different results. A nested logit analysis of forum choice failed to reach appropriate values of the dissimilarity parameter.

[Figure 3 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

Alliance portfolio similarity, unlike domestic regimes, does not influence forum selection. This may be due, in part, because members of security organizations that mediate conflicts between other members often do so at the behest of the alliance (Shannon 2009) or because alliance members have such a substantial interest in preserving peace among allies that they more immediately render dispute resolution services (Melin 2010). For example, in its mediation of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia frequently shifts between acting as the sole mediator and leading a coalition of OSCE members (Mooradian and Druckman 1999; “Russian President to Host Fresh Armenian-Azerbaijani Summit” 2010). This makes it difficult to disentangle disputants' motivations for pursuing peaceful settlement through a specific forum. Together, these results on the effect of joint democracy and alliance portfolio similarity suggest that transaction costs may not be an important consideration in the selection of management strategies. Disputants that have few issue linkages are no more likely to use IGOs as conflict managers than disputants that can draw from a wide range of linkages, except in the case of democracies, which are only more likely to use IGOs relative to other third-party fora. This may be due, in part, to the higher costs of going to war relative to peaceful settlement – states are willing to accept some bargaining costs to reach solutions that avoid militarized conflict.

The second set of hypotheses posited that information asymmetries would encourage states to seek out international organizations. Results from the empirical analysis, however, do not demonstrate this relationship. When the balance of capabilities favors the challenger, disputes

are more likely to be managed bilaterally, confirming hypothesis 3. But, as disputants come closer to parity with one another, they are more likely to invite other states, rather than IGOs, to manage their conflicts. Figure 5 shows that as disputants move from parity to an imbalance of power, their probability of negotiating bilaterally increases 20 percentage points.

[Figure 5 about here]

Partially supporting hypotheses 4 and 5, disputes characterized by low and high levels of issue salience are more likely to result in management by other states than bilateral negotiations.¹⁵ The theory predicted that disputant in low salience conflicts would be more likely to attempt bilateral management and that parties to highly salient disputes would be divided between bilateral negotiations and IGO management, depending upon their ability to reach an agreement in prenegotiation processes. Results from the model suggest, alternatively, that states use other fora, such as other states, for obtaining information about their adversaries. Figure 6 plots the predicted effect of issue salience on the use of state-led management. Relative to disputes characterized by moderate levels of salience, low salience conflicts are almost 10 percent more likely to pursue third-party management. Disputants in highly salient conflicts are approximately 7 percent more likely than states in less salient conflicts to select state-led fora. Low levels of issue salience have a sharper effect on the selection of state intermediaries, but both high and low levels of issue salience are positive and significant in relation to the use of other states in conflict management when taking dyadic claim characteristics into account. The convergence on mediation by other state actors indicates peaked preferences for third-party fora.

¹⁵ This result remains substantively unchanged using the 12-point salience scale, rather than the categorical variables.

This result provides evidence for the conjecture that issue salience is non-linear to forum selection.

[Figure 6 about here]

The final hypothesis predicted that outside conflicts would discourage states from appealing to international organizations for conflict management because opening settlement negotiations to public scrutiny could weaken a disputant relative to its other challengers. I find no support for this hypothesis in the selection of settlement fora. Forum selection strategies are not significantly influenced by concerns about other conflicts. This may be attributed to both the diversity and number of international organizations available to provide dispute settlement. As discussed above, IGOs vary significantly in their ability to transmit information to outside observers and to enforce agreements. Among these organizations, states may be selective about which fora they pursue dispute settlement. When disputants with on-going, outside conflicts elected to manage their dispute through an IGO – which occurred approximately 10 percent of the time – they frequently delegated non-binding authority to minimal or structural organizations, such as the UN Secretary General or the US-Mexico International Boundary Commission.¹⁶ The limited scope of these institutions provides evidence for the theory advanced by Busch (2007) that disputants in contentious conflicts do not avoid institutionalized fora in and of themselves. Instead, they try to limit the reach of the precedent set by an IGO-facilitated decision by selecting smaller or regional fora.

¹⁶ Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth (2008) code the UN Secretary General as a highly institutionalized, interventionist actor in international organizations. Evidence from Merrills (2005) suggests, alternatively, that the Secretary General has only a limited capacity to independently intervene in interstate conflicts. The Secretary General does not have the ability to render binding decisions and its activities are monitored by other organs of the UN.

Other variables generally behave as expected. When states elect to use binding management, they are overwhelmingly more likely to do so through institutionalized fora than with the assistance of other states.¹⁷ Furthermore, past experience with a forum strongly predicts its use in future settlement efforts. When disputants invited states to manage their conflicts in the past, they were more likely to re-invite a state intermediary to facilitate new negotiations. Likewise, states were more likely to return to an IGO if they had negotiated through an international organization in the past. The use of third parties was additionally encouraged when states had recently attempted to broker agreements or if they had a history of violence. Examining whether the type of issue under contention influences settlement strategies, the analysis shows that disputants in territorial conflicts are less likely to submit to the authority of international organizations, while disputants in maritime claims are less likely to trust other states to manage their conflicts. Both of these results provide evidence for the intuition that territorial conflicts are especially challenging to resolve (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Vásquez 1993) and that maritime conflicts benefit from norms that favor peaceful settlement through bilateral agreements and international organizations (Hensel, S. M. Mitchell, Sowers, et al. 2008; B. Mitchell 1976; Morgan 2002; Nemeth et al. 2006). Finally, membership in international organizations with explicit dispute settlement provisions has a pacifying effect on issue-based claims and states are more likely to take advantage of these institutions in resolving contentious conflicts.

¹⁷ Observations of binding conflict management in the ICOW data are generally associated with third-party management; thus, it is unsurprising that binding management has a positive effect of the selection of third party strategies overall. Application of this model to economic disputes, for example, might result in different findings because states often include provisions to arbitrate disputes in bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements (Davis 2007, 2009).

Discussion

Support for hypotheses 1 and 3 and the partial support for hypotheses 4 and 5 have interesting implications for understanding the use of international organizations in conflict management and conflict processes more generally. The first observation that democracies are less likely to use third-party management relative to bilateral negotiations seems, on face, counter-intuitive to previous findings by democratic peace scholars about the conduct of democracies in conflict. Dixon (1993) and Raymond (1994) in separate analyses find that jointly-democratic disputants are more likely to use institutional third parties to mediate disputes, citing their positive dispositions to the rule of law and support for norms of peaceful dispute settlement and reciprocity. This analysis uses a different set of cases to show that democracies do prefer to find institutional solutions to disagreement, but only compared to the option of selecting other types of third-party fora. I argue, instead, that democracies are able to contract around IGOs and can take advantage of their own domestic transparency to signal commitment to settlement negotiations. Taking into account other types of issue linkages, such as shared alliance portfolios, the results of this research are less consistent with a transaction costs theory of forum selection. Though democracies tend to share similar dispositions toward peaceful settlement, as Dixon and Raymond observe, these linkages do not make either bilateral negotiations or institutional management more efficient to pursue.

Instead, the results of this research suggest that democratic disputants are more sensitive to the transparency of a forum. When an acceptable international organization is not available to facilitate dispute settlement, democracies can use public statements to make negotiations more visible to outside parties. The effect of public statements is to make adversaries more

accountable to international and domestic audiences – an intention suggested in the statements made by representatives from India and Pakistan before recent bilateral negotiations (“S Asia rivals ‘to rebuild trust’” 2010). An additional benefit of democracies' domestic institutional transparency is that it is more difficult for democracies to conceal information about capabilities and resolve. Media freedom increases the flow of information, making third-parties less relevant to the process (Slantchev 2006). Therefore, the use of third-party fora is not necessarily a more efficient solution for democracies to the bargaining problems of information asymmetry and unwillingness to commit to settlement outcomes. This set of observations changes the narrative about democracies in conflict management established in earlier work on the democratic peace. Instead, they provide additional evidence for more recent observations that at the dispute level democracies take advantage of institutional similarities, avoid third-party fora, and retain authority over the management of policy outcomes (S. M. Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2009).

The second set of results shows that states resolve information asymmetries by inviting other states to facilitate settlement negotiations, rather than turning to neutral, international organizations. One conclusion that may be reached from these observations is that disputants do not trust IGOs to communicate information about capabilities and resolve. This is unsurprising given the vibrant debate among scholars regarding the role of third-party bias in conflict management. Young (1967) argues that only impartial or unbiased mediators can have an effective role in resolving disputes. Independent international organizations are especially well-suited to providing impartial information because they are not overtly influenced by any one state

and, instead, have professional staff to help facilitate agreements. However, Kydd (2003) demonstrates that intermediaries that are unbiased – meaning they are solely motivated by the goal of reaching a settlement – are more likely to lie than mediators that are aligned with one of the disputants. Given that a mediator receives a positive benefit from facilitating a settlement, a third party who is indifferent between the adversaries will be willing to tell a belligerent that his opponent is ready to fight unless he capitulates, even when it is not true, because the threat would obtain the mediator's desired result. This mediation strategy prevents disputants from building trust in the mediator and the information is taken to be incredible. A biased mediator, on the other hand, is trustworthy when he or she signals to an ally that an adversary intends to fight because the outside party would be adversely affected if the conflict escalated, in addition to costs assumed for failing to bring about peace.

Savun (2008) finds empirical support for this theory, observing that on average biased mediators are more successful than mediators who share few linkages with either of the disputants. Additionally, the more biased a mediator is, the more likely that negotiations will result in settlements. That disputants in low and high salience conflicts and situations where the balance of capabilities might lead to disagreements in prenegotiation stages of the conflict generally avoid IGOs and, instead, rely on other states help manage conflicts adds weight to the argument that disputants do not trust impartial intermediaries when confronted with information problems.

Ultimately, what this research shows is that the relationship between the ability of IGOs to facilitate dispute settlement and their selection as management fora depends on the bargaining

problems that prevent bilateral settlements to interstate conflicts. International organizations are more likely to be desirable to disputants that are more likely to face commitment problems in the implementation of settlement agreements. Democratic governments must appease domestic populations in addition to rivals in the management of interstate conflicts. IGOs can play a face-saving role by assuming an intermediary role in the settlement of conflicts between democracies, resolving the commitment problem between those states when they cannot use public statement to signal sincere intentions to follow through with settlement obligations. IGOs, on the other hand, are less frequently trusted to transmit sensitive information about capabilities and resolve. Instead, disputants are more likely to turn to other states to help resolve information asymmetries.

Taken together, these results contribute to the literature on conflict management and forum shopping by demonstrating the various factors that influence forum selection. Of particular note is the observation that commitment problems and information asymmetries have a non-linear relationship to preferences over management fora. Conceptualizing a management forum according to the features that make formal IGOs effective in regulating international behavior, I observe that states facing commitment problems tend to have divergent preferences which are shaped by their ability to contract around international organizations. Alternatively, preferences over settlement fora as predicted by information asymmetries are single-peaked in nature, and disputants tend to avoid untrustworthy fora, including neutral IGOs and other adversaries. Future research may consider investigating how other conflict management mechanisms, such as decision control and third-party bias influence, are reflected in disputants' preferences over settlement fora and the types of strategies adversaries agree to.

Conclusion

Hedley Bull is famously quoted, “[W]hile order in world politics is something valuable, ... to show that a particular institution or course of action is conducive of order is not to have established a presumption that that institution is desirable or that that course of action should be carried out” (1977, 94). A substantial body of work demonstrates that international organizations are effective conflict managers, both at the systemic and dispute level. IGOs encourage norms of peaceful dispute settlement and directly help states resolve conflicts by reducing bargaining costs, transmitting information, brokering agreements and imposing non-compliance costs on states that renege on settlement obligations. Accordingly, international organizations have acquired a reputation among international relations scholars as effective conflict management fora. Despite this reputation, states rarely submit to institutionalized dispute resolution. It seems that IGOs suffer the same fate Bull observed about a global world order – though they are effective at regulating conflict, IGOs are not necessarily desirable fora.

The project provides one perspective on the disuse of IGOs in conflict management, conceptualizing forum shopping as a selection of various institutional management features. I isolate functions of IGOs in conflict management to three mechanisms: IGOs reduce transaction costs, transmit information, and resolve uncertainties about disputants' commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts. In establishing this framework, I point out the ways in which states can co-opt these mechanisms to other settlement fora, such as bilateral negotiations and state-led mediation. From this, I predicted that states that have more latitude within any particular dimension – meaning that they have the greater ability to adapt features of that mechanisms to other, extra-institutional efforts – are more likely to avoid institutionalized fora in favor of other

strategies. I find, in particular, that democracies and disputes characterized by incentives to misrepresent information about capabilities and resolve are the most likely to forum shop across settlement mechanisms and translate the features that make international organizations especially effective at managing conflicts to bilateral negotiations and state-led management.

Finally, I find that disputants are highly selective in choosing a forum for settlement negotiations as joint democracy and issue salience are both non-linearly related to forum selection. Where jointly democratic disputants tend to avoid other state actors in conflict management – due in part to their need to seek political cover from domestic populations – preferences over management fora converge on the selection of state intermediaries among disputants in high and low salience conflicts. These results suggest that international organizations are less trustworthy in transmitting information in conflict management scenarios, but can provide effective enforcement mechanisms for compliance with settlement agreements. These findings have implications for future work that assess other dimensions of forum shopping in conflict management and its effect of management outcomes. The selective nature in which IGOs are invited to participate in interstate conflict management raises questions for future research about the direct effectiveness of international organizations in regulating international conflict.

Table 1: Summary of Control Variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Effect</i>
<u>Claim characteristics:</u>		
Management approach	The management approach, binding or non-binding, used to facilitate a settlement.	Binding management efforts are more likely to be conducted through IGOs (Gent and Shannon 2011).
Previous forum	The type of management forum, bilateral negotiations, other state, IGO, used in the previous attempt to settle this claim.	Disputants are more likely to re-employ the same types of management fora (Wiegand and Powell 2010).
Recent settlement attempts	Total number of attempts, peaceful and militarized, to resolve the conflict in the last year.	More attempts to resolve a conflict are likely to result in third-party, IGO management.
Successful settlement in the last 5 years	Number of successful settlement attempts in the last 5 years for this claim.	More successful attempts are likely to result in IGO management.
MIDs in the last 5 years	Number of militarized disputes over this claim in the last 5 years.	Histories of violence are likely to result in low-level, bilateral negotiations.
Issue type	The type of issue, territorial, river, or maritime, at stake in the claim.	Territorial conflicts are less likely to be resolved through third-party management, while maritime and river claims are more likely to be managed through IGOs.
<u>Dyad characteristics:</u>		
Joint MTOPS Membership	The number of shared memberships in international organizations that have explicit provisions for the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes.	Joint-IGO memberships are likely to result in the use of IGOs in conflict management (Shannon 2009).

Table 2: Most Frequently Used Third-Party Intermediaries in the Management of Territorial, Maritime and River Disputes, 1816-2001


<i>Rank</i>	<i>Third-Party ID</i>	<i># Obs.</i>	<i>% of Cases</i>
1	United States	75	20.27%
2	United Kingdom	60	16.22%
3	International Court of Justice	15	4.05%
4	Paris Peace Conference	11	2.97%
5	Peru	10	2.70%
5	UN Security Council	10	2.70%
5	European Community/European Union	10	2.70%
8	Brazil	9	2.43%
8	Germany	9	2.43%
8	US-Mexico Boundary Commission	9	2.43%
<i>Total</i>		218	58.90% [†]
[†] = As a percent of all third-party dispute settlement attempts.			

Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Peaceful Settlement Fora in Territorial, Maritime, and River Claims

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model 1: State-led vs. Bilateral</i>	<i>Model 2: IGO-led vs. Bilateral</i>	<i>Model 3: IGO-led vs. State-led</i>
Joint democracy	-.0548** (0.255)	0.466 (0.399)	1.014** (0.444)
Alliance portfolio	0.129 (0.277)	0.746 (0.526)	0.616 (0.535)
Relative capabilities	-2.415*** (0.696)	-0.887 (1.389)	1.529 (1.336)
Low salience	0.584* (0.318)	0.012 (0.575)	-0.572 (0.580)
High salience	1.014*** (0.248)	0.556 (0.394)	-0.458 (0.397)
Outside conflicts	-0.337 (0.321)	0.632 (0.595)	0.969 (0.641)
Binding management	4.896*** (1.133)	6.752*** (1.104)	1.855*** (0.532)
Previous forum: State	1.152*** (0.235)	0.801* (0.423)	-0.352 (0.424)
Previous forum: IGO	-0.305 (0.688)	1.735*** (0.449)	2.040*** (0.628)
Settlement attempts in last year	0.270*** (0.091)	0.312*** (0.099)	0.042 (0.114)
MIDs in the last 5 years	0.507*** (0.139)	0.217 (0.275)	-0.290 (0.251)
Successful settlements in last 5 years	0.061 (0.081)	-0.037 (0.138)	-0.097 (0.152)
Territorial issue	-0.328 (0.312)	-1.955*** (0.543)	-1.627*** (0.567)
Maritime issue	-0.854** (0.3990)	-0.427 (0.484)	0.427 (0.523)
Shared peaceful settlement IGOs	-0.051 (0.055)	0.114* (0.062)	0.166** (0.068)
Intercept	0.022 (0.791)	-3.777*** (1.203)	-3.799*** (1.258)
N = 881, Pseudo R ² = 0.2823			
<i>Note:</i> Estimation coefficients and robust standard errors reported. Standard errors adjusted for 266 clusters of dyadic claims. * = $p < 0.1$, ** = $p < 0.05$, *** = $p < 0.01$			

Figure 1: Number of Multilateral Peaceful Settlement Treaties and Organizations

1816-2005



Areas of Potential Agreement in Conflict Bargaining, given Issue Salience




Figure 2

Figure 3: Predicted Effect of Joint Democracy on Forum Selection




Figure 4: Forum Selection by Jointly Democratic Disputants




Figure 5: Predicted Effect of Relative Capabilities on Bilateral Negotiations




Figure 6: Predicted Effect of Issue Salience on State-led Management




Table A1: Institutionalization of Multilateral Treaties of Peaceful Settlement

<i>International Organization Name</i>	<i>Institutionalization (Boehmer, Gartzke, Nordstrom 2004)</i>
League of Nations	Structural
League of Nations Council	Structural
League of Nations Judicial Committee	Structural
Permanent Court of International Justice	Interventionist
United Nations	Interventionist
United Nations Secretary General	Interventionist
United Nations Security Council	Interventionist
United Nations Peacekeeping Organization	Interventionist
International Court of Justice	Interventionist
Hague/Permanent Court of Arbitration	Structural
Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council	Interventionist
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Structural
Organization for Economic Development	Structural
Organization of American States	Structural
Inter-American Peace Committee	Structural
Inter-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration	Interventionist
US-Canada International Joint Commission	Minimal
US-Mexico International Boundary Commission	Minimal
Central American Court	Interventionist
Central American Court of Justice	Interventionist
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	Minimal
Paris Peace Conferences, I & II	Minimal
European Community/European Union	Interventionist
European Court of Justice	Interventionist
Central Rhine Commission	Structural
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development	Structural
Baltic Assembly	Structural

**Based on codings from Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth (2008) using the list of Multilateral Treaties of Peaceful Settlement (MTOPS) data (Hensel 2005).

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